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Introduction 
 On November 11, 1924, the St. Louis police deployed a strategy used for 
generations to grapple with the city’s “floating population,” homeless men without 
families. One city newspaper reported that the police arrested two hundred of these men 
in a “drive against petty beggars” and “chronic loafers.” According to the newspaper, the 
police ordered these men to “quit begging on the streets, to find work, leave St. Louis, or 
end up in the City Workhouse if they are arrested on the streets again.”1 Aside from 
disclosing that large numbers of homeless men lurked the city’s streets, the report 
highlighted the meagre relief network that could be accessed by homeless men. While the 
homeless could receive temporary shelter care at the city’s Municipal Lodging House, 
expulsion from the city and hard labor made up important components of “relief” for 
homeless men. The report also illuminated the deviancy of “floating” men: instead of 
supporting families, these were men who did not work and instead loitered on the streets, 
earning an illegitimate income through begging. This system would begin to change in 
1925 with the creation of the Bureau for Homeless Men, a private welfare agency that 
served homeless men. The Bureau endeavored not only to reform the way homeless men 
received relief, but, through professionalized casework, the individual homeless man as 
well.  
Between 1925 and 1940, relief for homeless men in St. Louis, as well as Missouri 
more generally, underwent significant change. The transformations wrought by the 
Bureau for Homeless Men illuminate key aspects of welfare policy and state 
                                                 
 1 “200 Street Beggars Arrested by Police: Drive Started to Clear City of Chronic Loafers”, St. 
Louis Globe Democrat, 12 November 1924.  
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development, especially as they pertain to homeless men. First, the Bureau, a private 
casework agency, played the most important role in transforming the way homeless men 
received relief. The Bureau consolidated the relief network for homeless men and 
assumed responsibility for them, instituting a professionalized, casework program 
centered at its headquarters. When the cost of relief for the homeless shifted to the federal 
government with the creation of the New Deal’s Federal Transient Program in 1933, the 
Bureau continued to play a prominent role. The Bureau was tapped to construct the 
infrastructure for the operations in Missouri as well as administer much of the program. 
Second, gender, in particular the Bureau’s vision of manhood, mattered immensely to the 
structure of the policies the Bureau created, both as a private agency and when it worked 
for the federal government. Taken together, these two points suggest that social workers 
attempted to define and solve more problems in the 1920s and 1930s than previously 
understood by historians.        
 The Bureau for Homeless Men’s entire agenda of reform revolved around its 
casework program, and the private welfare agency’s vision of manhood guided its 
casework. The Bureau’s vision of manhood reflected the prominent, albeit unfulfilled, 
ideal of companionate marriage that gained greater currency with white collar or middle 
class workers during the 1920s.2 The companionate ideal espoused above all else that 
“home life was the center of everything.”3 The notion of companionate marriage 
                                                 
 2 Peter Filene, Him/Her/Self: Gender Identities in Modern America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  
University Press, 1975), 155-156; Elizabeth and Joseph Pleck argue that the 1920s began the period of 
“companionate providing,” which would come to define important aspects of manhood, Elizabeth and 
Joseph Pleck, The American Man (New York: Prentice Hall, 1980), 6, 28; Anthony Rotundo argues that 
companionate marriage steadily increased throughout the nineteenth century, but became especially 
prevalent toward the end of the nineteenth century, Anthony Rotundo, American Manhood: 
Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to  
the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 164.    
 3 Filene, Him/Her/Self, 156.   
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symbolized a move away from the homosocial world of male work and play, and toward 
the heterosocial world of home and family.4 Men would now prove their manhood in the 
home by being good husbands and fathers.5 For the Bureau, the family was “a natural 
outgrowth of the very nature of man, [and] every effort should be made toward its 
preservation.”6 By hanging out on the city streets, in the lodging houses, and on the 
nation’s roads, primarily with other men, the Bureau argued that homeless men 
absconded from familial obligations and threatened the fabric of family life. Previous 
attempts at helping the homeless man, through shelters or hard labor, for example, 
ignored the crucial element of family as a stabilizing force in a man’s life. Far from 
helping the man become a family man, the Bureau argued that this relief system and its 
methods only exacerbated the man’s isolation from the heterosocial family and 
encouraged him to live in the largely homosocial world of homeless men. Through 
casework interviews, the Bureau hoped to make homeless men achieve the ideal of the 
companionate man.   
 The Bureau’s use of casework therapy to help a man adjust to its vision of 
companionate manhood suggests a more complicated understanding of “homeless” than 
simply “having no home, shelter, or place of refuge,” as the term is now defined.7 Many 
                                                 
 4 For discussions of the male homosocial world, see George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, 
Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Pleck, 
The American Man; Howard Chudacoff, The Age of the Bachelor: Creating an American Subculture 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Ava Baron, “Reflections on Class, Gender, and Sexuality: 
Masculinity, the Embodied Male  
Worker, and the Historian’s Gaze.” International Labor and Working Class History 69 (Spring 2006); For 
the homosocial character of transient life, see Frank Higbie, Indispensable Outcasts: Hobo Workers and 
Community in the American Midwest: 1880-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Todd 
DePastino, Citizen Hobo: How a Century of Homelessness Changed America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003).    
 5 Pleck, The American Man, 31.  
 6 Casework With Homeless Men and Boys, 8, Folder 332, Box 13, Papers of the Bureau for Men, 
1925-1982, State Historical Society of Missouri, St. Louis.   
7 “Homeless,” Oxford English Dictionary.   
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of the men who visited the Bureau for help stayed in a variety of places, be it flop hotels, 
the Municipal Lodging House, or even apartments or houses, either in St. Louis or other 
cities. Not all of these forms of shelter could be considered traditional, of course, but for 
the Bureau this mattered less than the man’s relationship to family. Instead of seeing 
shelter as the man’s primary deficiency, the Bureau problematized the homeless man in 
terms of its vision of male gender. The Bureau succinctly defined the homeless man in 
this fashion as one whose “responsibilities, movements and plans are not limited by or at 
present concerned with family life.”8 The Bureau’s understanding of homelessness as a 
problem of gender, and not shelter, would significantly shape its casework program and 
its approach to the problem of homelessness in St. Louis.  
 The Bureau’s use of the term “unattached” to describe homeless men is similarly 
problematic. The Bureau’s clients formed countless attachments to people as they worked 
and traveled. These men could form bonds with other men or with women. Additionally, 
these men might have left behind families as they traveled looking for work. For the 
Bureau, however, these men were simply not attached in the right way. These men lived 
in a primarily male world and had inconsistent, transitory, and perhaps even infrequent 
relationships with women. The Bureau wanted its clients to abjure life as a “single” man 
and all of its attendant relationships. The term “unattached,” then, does not signify a man 
with not friends or family whatsoever. Instead, the term unattached describes a man who 
is not attached to a heterosexual, sedentary family.  
                                                 
 8 Casework With Homeless Men and Boys, 1. The Bureau used a variety of terms when discussing 
its clients, but primarily utilized “homeless,” “non-family,” and “unattached.” This work generally uses 
“homeless” and “unattached.”  
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 Although the Bureau’s understanding of manhood appears universal, racial 
boundaries, often unspoken, played an important limiting role. Most importantly, the 
caseworkers at the Bureau for Homeless Men envisioned the proper man as white. To be 
sure, the Bureau did provide relief to homeless black men. In fact, the primary agency for 
African Americans in St. Louis, the Urban League, did not provide relief to the 
homeless.9 Nonetheless, the Bureau often marginalized its black clients. The agency’s 
activities make clear that it often placed black men in the portions of its program 
populated by men the Bureau believed to be the least capable of rehabilitation. According 
to one of the few case records the Bureau kept on its black clients, the organization 
believed that “the colored people generally have less regard for family conventions…”10 
Although the Bureau would provide relief to homeless black men, it did not envision 
them as capable of becoming good fathers and husbands. In this sense, then, the 
caseworkers at the Bureau could not be categorized, along with some of their female 
colleagues in other fields of social work, as “racial liberals,” believing African Americans 
to be capable of conforming to the standards of white society.11 The Bureau’s program 
might be better described as embracing a “class liberalism.” For the Bureau, gender and 
race combined neatly to form the ideal man, whose boundaries remained open to working 
class men.12     
                                                 
9 For an overview of the Urban League’s activities in St. Louis, see Series 7, Box 1, Annual 
Reports, Urban League Papers, Washington University Archives, St. Louis.  
10 Cases to Form Basis for Publicity by Council on Relief, Case 33, Folder 84, Box 4, Papers of 
the Bureau.   
11 For a discussion of racial liberalism, see Gwendolyn Mink, Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in 
the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).   
12 For a deeper discussion of the relationship between masculinity, gender, and race, see Gail 
Bederman, Manliness and Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).  
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 The Bureau’s emphasis upon manhood and casework is evident in all the aspects 
of its activities discussed here: its work with men at the Municipal Lodging House, the 
creation of a homeless men’s cafeteria, its anti-begging and boy’s programs, and the plan 
the Bureau created and administered for the New Deal’s Federal Transient Program in 
Missouri. Before the Bureau began its work in 1925, the relief setup in St. Louis 
consisted of few accommodations for homeless men. In 1912, the city opened its first 
Municipal Lodging House. The lodging house operated from November to March or 
April each year, serving as a home for destitute men during the cold winter months when 
work was often scarce.13 In the years before the city opened its lodging house, the 
Provident Association, a family casework agency in St. Louis, operated a lumber yard 
and shelter for homeless men, but promptly closed its shelter once the city opened its 
own.14 Aside from these bare provisions, homeless men sometimes found a night’s rest at 
a police station or at a privately owned cheap hotel. Especially common was the practice, 
which could hardly be described as relief, of passing on.15 This method involved a city or 
private welfare agency paying for a homeless man’s train ticket in order to “pass on” the 
man and his problems to the next city. In general, this system could be classified as 
decentralized and operating outside the bounds of professional social work. The Bureau 
described this entire system as inefficient because it primarily focused upon group or 
                                                 
 13 Clinton Rodgers Woodruff, ed. National Municipal Review (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins 
Co., 1912), 323.  
 14 History of the St. Louis Provident Association, 1860-1930 by Dorothy LeMond, 120, 1933, 
Folder 10, Box 1, Papers of the Family and Children’s Services of Greater St. Louis, 1861-1960, State 
Historical Society of Missouri, St. Louis.  
 15 Outdoor Relief in Missouri: A Study of its Administration by County Officials, 1915, Folder 12, 
Box 3, Publications – School of Social Work, 1907-2011, Washington University Archives, St. Louis; For 
an extensive discussion of “passing on” and lodging houses in New York, see Joan M. Crouse, The 
Homeless Transient in the Great Depression: New York State, 1929-1941 (New York: State University 
Press of New York, 1986).   
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mass care and allowed the individual to subsist as a homeless, unattached man. 
Attendants at the lodging house or the police station, according to the Bureau, paid little 
attention to the homeless man as an individual. In contrast, the Bureau sought to help the 
homeless man as an individual and on an individual, casework basis to help him adjust to 
family life.     
 This pre-1925 relief system reflected many long held assumptions about 
homeless, unattached men. Previous scholars have paid close attention to the way notions 
of class, gender, family, and community worked together in the minds of Americans to 
shape attitudes toward such men. These scholars have demonstrated that, although the 
problem presented by unattached men appears perennial, its meanings are historically 
constructed and reflect a larger struggle over the role men play in families, communities, 
and workplaces. Generally speaking, the unattached, homeless man has been described as 
a threat, a threat that expressed contradictory notions of gender and labor. On the one 
hand, he has been portrayed as too masculine or too independent because he lived on the 
streets and worked when it suited him. On the other, because he did not have a stable job 
and family life, because he begged for money, he was not masculine enough. The 
unattached life also opened the man to accusations of sexual deviancy, as a man to be 
kept away from children.16 
These extremely negative perceptions of homeless men help explain why the 
developing profession of social work largely turned toward other populations. Although 
social workers primarily assisted destitute families and single mothers, historians have 
argued that the “modern” problem of homelessness arose simultaneously with the 
                                                 
 16 Higbie, Indispensable Outcasts, 2, 10, 12; Depastino, Citizen Hobo, xvii. Tim Cresswell, The 
Tramp in America (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 94.  
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emergence of modern social science and social work in the 1870s. For these newly 
emerging professions, the homeless man’s distance from family life appeared to many 
social work agencies interested in family casework as precluding the man from help. 
Professor Francis Wayland, for example, in a paper given to the American Social Science 
Association in 1877 stated that, because the unattached man lacked home and family ties, 
he “cut himself off from all influences which can minister to his improvement or 
elevation.”17 The policies of the Charity Organization Society (COS), a leader in 
streamlined, scientific charity formed in the U.S. in the 1870s, reflect Professor 
Wayland’s comment. Because of the threat the COS believed these men posed, it 
advocated for hard labor and even lifetime segregation in labor colonies.18 The 
caseworkers at the Bureau tapped into and expressed the same understanding of its clients 
as dangerous, deviant men. Yet the Bureau ultimately believed that hard labor and 
segregation merely exacerbated the problem of homelessness and emphasized helping 
homeless men become parts of families.  
While the Bureau sought to change the way homeless, unattached men received 
relief, it often borrowed from these old meanings in order to situate its understanding of 
its clients and galvanize support for its programs. Both the Bureau’s internal documents 
and its publications and speeches are replete with many of the same virulent attacks 
against homeless men as essentially deviant, deficient men. The caseworkers at the 
Bureau distinguished themselves by tapping into the optimism of professional social 
work, that a wide array of social problems could be solved through casework, and 
                                                 
 17 Quoted in Michael Katz, Poverty and Policy in American History (New York: Academic Press, 
1983), 161.  
 18 Kenneth Kusmer, Down and Out, On the Road (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002 ), 79.  
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applying it to homeless men. The Bureau utilized these older meanings associated with 
homeless, unattached men in order to make the problem seem immediate and in need of 
solving. Of course, the Bureau could have broken not only with the old relief system, but 
with these older meanings as well by portraying homeless men as worthy of relief 
because they deserve the pity or sympathy of society, or because they performed 
important, even if irregular, labor. As shall become clear, the Bureau’s decision not to 
break with the past in this respect would have important ramifications for the shape of 
relief for the homeless during the New Deal and after. 
 Although the Bureau’s attempt to bring casework to homeless, unattached men set 
it apart from its colleagues, its work nonetheless followed patterns similar to other 
emerging professional social workers and it therefore compliments the larger story of 
social work professionalization. For example, the Bureau was part of the process of 
revitalizing the notion of individual rehabilitation while eschewing larger social reform.19 
Although many of the Bureau’s clients clearly suffered from long term unemployment, 
the Bureau did not believe structural economic problems to be the source of the 
individual man’s woes. Instead, the Bureau understood its client’s problems through a 
rubric of gender. Like other social workers that gained prominence during the 1920s, the 
Bureau also supplanted religious organizations. While the Provident Association closed 
its lodging house and lumber yard in 1912, it still provided occasional relief to men who 
applied. The Salvation Army provided similar temporary relief. When the Bureau began 
its operations in 1925, both the Provident Association and the Salvation Army ceased 
                                                 
 19 William Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 
(New York: Free Press, 1979), 154; For a discussion of social workers who kept the spirit of social reform 
alive, see Robyn Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 1890-1935 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991).  
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providing relief to homeless men and began sending applicants for relief to the Bureau. 
This centralizing move reflects many of the bureaucratic tendencies common in 1920s 
social work.20 Aside from consolidating relief, the Bureau also formed a network of 
internal committees and subgroups to deal with specialized tasks, such as the 
organization’s Citizens’ Anti-Begging Committee. Finally, and most importantly, the 
Bureau’s work expressed the same concern about the future of the family as a social 
grouping as its other social work colleagues.  
 The Bureau’s activities also reflect the importance of gender as a motivating and 
structuring factor for social policy. Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the 
present, historians have argued that gender has mattered immensely to the history of 
welfare in the United States. As historian Regina Kunzel argued, while women who 
worked in religious charity organizations dedicated to helping unwed mothers rallied 
around their gender, professionalizing women in social work deemphasized their gender 
and sought to appear as objective and scientific, both masculine traits.21 Nonetheless, 
women created a “female dominion” in American reform, establishing important 
institutions and policies at all levels of government and society ran by professional 
female social workers.22 Many of these programs sought to help single mothers and their 
children.23 A particular understanding of women as dependent and properly belonging in 
the home, where they could care for children, significantly shaped the debates and 
implementation of mother’s pensions, the Sheppard Towner Act of 1921, and Aid to 
                                                 
 20 For both the diminishment of religious relief organizations and the spread of bureaucracy in 
relief, see Regina Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls: Unmarried Women and the Professionalization 
of Social Work, 1890-1945, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 44. 
 21 Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls, 62.  
 22 Robyn Muncy, Creating A Female Dominion in American Reform.   
 23 Molly Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890-1930 (Urbana:  
University of Illinois Press, 1995).   
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Dependent Children (ADC), part of the omnibus welfare legislation passed during the 
New Deal known as the Social Security Act.24 Gender continued to play an important role 
past the New Deal era. When ADC came under attack beginning in the 1950s, many 
believed the program was in need of reform because it supported unworthy, mostly black, 
women.25  
 Gender also mattered immensely to the work of the Bureau for Homeless Men, 
but the relationship between masculinity, particularly single manhood, and social policy 
has been less well explored by historians. Some historians have argued that the notion of 
the white male breadwinner shaped the Old Age Security provision of the 1935 Social 
Security Act. The program sought to shore up the male breadwinner ideal by providing 
survivor’s benefits as well a contributory pension to some retired, mostly white, men. 
This pension was provided as a return for services rendered, namely work, and the 
program was deemed an entitlement that elevated, socially and politically, the receiver.26 
More recently, scholars have examined the connections between expectations of male 
breadwinning and family courts designed to help deserted women during the Progressive 
Era. Nonetheless, historians have primarily written about individuals who are “attached” 
to someone, be it children or families, and have not fully considered masculinity as a 
significant factor in social policy.  
                                                 
 24 Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood; Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single 
Mothers and the History of Welfare (New York: Free Press, 1994); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: 
Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 25 Jennifer Mittelstadt, From Welfare to Workfare: The Unintended Consequences of Liberal  
Reform, 1945-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Marissa Chappell, The War on 
Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011).    
 26 Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled.   
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 By moving away from men who have dependents or are married, and by focusing 
upon those that certain policies have deemed “unattached,” important insights can be 
gained concerning the relationship between masculinity and social policy. First, it widens 
the framework within which historians can talk about men and welfare. A sole focus 
upon married men and Old Age Security elides and effaces important distinctions in 
masculinity and construes the gendered male subject narrowly. These differences in 
manhood, between married and unmarried, had important ramifications for the shape of 
social policy in the United States, as will be seen in the discussion here of the place of the 
Federal Transient Program in the New Deal. Past studies that touch on the relationship 
between masculinity and Old Age Security, for example, portray white men as having 
received the most remunerative, least stigmatizing set of benefits from the welfare state. 
As this work hopes to make clear, these positive benefits accrued mostly to white men 
with families. Unattached, homeless men did not receive the same level or type of benefit 
received by family men. The relief they received was, like that provided to single 
mothers, often paltry and came with stigmatizing, searching investigations of one’s 
personality and social life.  
An examination of the Bureau’s work demonstrates, then, that caseworkers in the 
1920s cast a much wider net than historians have previously understood. Although it was 
not as prevalent as casework with destitute families or single mothers, the Bureau’s 
existence, along with its correspondence with similar agencies across the country, 
suggests that social workers undertook a wider array of problems in the 1920s. St. Louis 
serves as an excellent location for examining this understudied aspect of social work for a 
number of reasons. In the 1920s, St. Louis still had a large industrial sector that drew 
13 
 
many men in search of jobs.27 In 1923, for example, over 150,000 men came to St. Louis 
for work, while there were as many as 18,000 homeless men staying in St. Louis during 
that winter.28 Furthermore, the attractions and entertainment of an urban environment like 
St. Louis drew many men searching for a respite from the agricultural labor of the 
summer. The railroad infrastructure of St. Louis also ensured that men heading either east 
or west would pass through the city. Most importantly, social workers in St. Louis 
attempted to bring casework to homeless men much sooner than their colleagues in other 
cities. Later in the 1920s and into the early 1930s, social work organizations across the 
country wrote to the Bureau seeking advice on how to begin performing casework with 
unattached men. Studying the St. Louis Bureau for Homeless Men also illuminates the 
way that local, private organizations influenced, municipal, state, and even federal social 
policy. It is clear, then, that the caseworkers at the Bureau for Homeless Men were 
responding to a large population that, as the introductory anecdote makes suggests, some 
in St. Louis found troubling.  
In 1925, the initiative to expend resources on casework and therapeutic 
rehabilitation for homeless men rested with the St. Louis social work community. The 
historical record does not suggest that a broad movement of citizens in St. Louis existed 
that advocated for a more concerted program, in particular a casework program, to deal 
with homeless men on the streets. This fact is important because it suggests that, at least 
in St. Louis, there was not a general outpouring of interest in the problem of homeless 
men as, for example, there existed for problems relating to motherhood in the early 
                                                 
27James Primm, Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri, 1764-1980 (Saint Louis: Missouri 
Historical Society Press, 1998).   
28 Walter Hoy, “The Care of the Homeless in St. Louis.” The Family (October 1928): 214-215.  
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twentieth century. St. Louisans, like other Americans, probably just wished to have 
homeless men cleared from the streets, but expended little effort on the problem. This 
lack of interest in helping homeless men, along with a general feeling of hostility toward 
them, continued to be apparent when public funds were spent on homeless men during 
the period of the Federal Transient Program. Some social workers in St. Louis active in 
the Community Council, an organization that dispensed funds to private social work 
organizations, appear to have seen the problem of homelessness as an area into which 
social workers could expand, and then created an organization equipped to deal with 
homeless men.29 These social workers saw the creation of the Bureau for Homeless Men 
as a complimentary extension of the broader casework agenda of providing professional 
relief while also bolstering traditional family life.     
 The Bureau for Homeless Men also helps to illuminate another understudied 
aspect of the American welfare state, the role of men as social workers. At its highpoint 
in the 1920s, women made up probably ninety percent of the social work profession, yet 
men often played important roles in the development of professional organizations for 
social workers and often served in administrative or managerial capacities in various 
welfare organizations. Among many examples, men served as editors of two leading 
social work periodicals, The Family and Charities.30 This focus on upper level positions 
ignores men who practiced casework in social work agencies and does not help explain 
why men would want to join an overwhelmingly female profession. The caseworkers at 
                                                 
29 Meeting Minutes of the Committee on Homeless Men and Street Begging, 20 September 1923, 
Folder 9, Box 1, Papers of the Bureau.   
 30 Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls, 46; The Family, 1 no.2 (April 1920); Gordon, Pitied But 
Not  
Entitled, 92, 312-313.  
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the Bureau, mostly men themselves, provided few explicit reasons for joining the 
profession, but the scant record can be made more explicit through reference to the 
historical context within which they acted. First, these men undoubtedly felt comfortable 
with the objective, scientific, masculine methods underpinning the professionalization of 
social work. Interestingly, though, in contrast to some of their female colleagues, 
caseworkers at the Bureau appealed to their gender and argued that male caseworkers 
could best help male clients. This argument was made explicit in the Bureau’s Boy’s 
Program, and was implicit in the Bureau’s choice to hire as many male caseworkers as 
possible, no doubt a tough task given the predominance of women in the profession.31   
The entrance of men into the social work profession should perhaps not even be 
seen as an aberration. As some historians have argued, turn of the century men cultivated 
a “social reform manliness” that celebrated men pursuing social betterment. These 
reformers pursued a variety of goals, from reforming government to revitalizing manhood 
through the formation of sporting clubs.32 The caseworkers at the Bureau undoubtedly 
perceived themselves as working within this tradition. Furthermore, historians have also 
noted that some men in the early twentieth century found it difficult to affirm their 
manhood in repetitive office jobs and in the face of the social upheavals of the 1920s and 
1930s represented by suffrage, women’s entrance into the workplace, the loss of 
individuality in a corporate and bureaucratized workplace, and the Great Depression.33 In 
                                                 
 31 Like the Boy Scouts and the YMCA, the social workers at the Bureau insisted that boys’ work 
should be done by male workers, David Macleod, Building Character in the American Boy: The Boy 
Scouts, YMCA, and their  
Forerunners, 1870-1920 Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 44.   
 32 Filene, Him/Her/Self, 75; Kevin Murphy Political Manhood: Red Bloods, Mollycoddles, and the 
Politics of Progressive Era Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 4-6.   
 33 Filene, Him/Her/Self, 73, 140; Stearns, Be A Man!; Pleck, The American Man, 25; Michael 
Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 128; 
Murphy, Political Manhood, 203.  
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response, many turned toward their sons to redeem their manhood, while other men 
worked with the YMCA and the Boy Scouts.34 The Bureau’s emphasis upon a family 
centered manhood could be seen as an expression of the instability and uncertainty white 
collar and middle class men felt when they entered their new workplaces. The family 
would be the arena in which they could restore their manhood. While this is perhaps a 
more speculative argument, the Bureau’s work might be viewed similarly, as a way to 
escape office work, pursue lofty goals, and reaffirm a sense of manhood. In any case, the 
Bureau’s vision of manhood expressed and sought to instantiate the white collar 
masculinity. 
 Despite the novelty of its case work approach with unattached men, and the fact 
that its correspondence files are filled with inquiries and accolades it received from its 
colleagues across the country seeking to replicate its program, the Bureau for Homeless 
Men remains understudied.35 This is partially the result of the argument made by some 
historians that, after World War I, the problems associated with roving men that began in 
the 1870s disappeared because the jobs that supported them, in agriculture and railroads, 
were less available.36 The line has perhaps been drawn too sharply, and this argument 
nonetheless cannot explain what happened to these men after their jobs vanished. To be 
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sure, one historian admitted that homelessness increased during the 1920s, yet argued, 
with little evidence, that people viewed the homeless man with a nostalgia influenced by 
the characters created by Charlie Chaplin and Jack London.37 Another historian echoed 
this point, and further argued that these cultural depictions played an important role in 
influencing the Federal Transient Program.38 By not paying closer attention to the 1920s, 
previous scholars have missed an important link in the development of social policy 
crafted for homeless, unattached men. The fear of unattached men lingered into the 
1920s, and it was this fear, not nostalgia, that formed an important impetus for the 
Bureau’s programs. Furthermore, these programs, and not nostalgic stories and movies, 
would lay the groundwork for the Federal Transient Program in 1933.       
 The work of the Bureau for Homeless Men during the 1920s and early 1930s also 
reveals an important feature of the way social policies developed in the United States 
during this period. As many scholars of the welfare state have made clear, social workers 
outside of government played a crucial role in the construction of government welfare 
policy. Historians have called this pattern of public/private cooperation the “associative 
state.”39 The work of the Bureau reflects this form of government operation. The Bureau, 
ostensibly a private agency, worked closely with the municipal government of St. Louis 
to provide relief and care to homeless men. The city government provided the Bureau 
with office space for casework early on, and the two worked closely together on one of 
the Bureau’s important early projects, the anti-begging program. More significantly, one 
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might argue that the Bureau actually supplanted the city in the delivery of relief to 
homeless men. The Bureau played an important role in the operation of the city’s 
Municipal Lodging House and greatly expanded the services available for unattached, 
homeless men. As a private welfare agency, the Bureau acted as a policy innovator by 
developing and/or applying new techniques and institutions for the delivery of relief to 
homeless men in St. Louis.     
 Most importantly, the institutions created by the Bureau, and the particular vision 
of manhood that structured its programs, played an important role in how the Bureau 
developed Missouri’s transient program in 1933. This conceptual and institutional 
continuity has particular importance for our understanding of the Federal Transient 
Program. Historians often portray the transient program as a drastic departure from 
previous efforts at relief, as a program that “opened up radical possibilities for the 
structuring of American social provision.”40 Similarly, the transient program is discussed 
as if it had no precedent in welfare policy, as if it were simply a product of the federal 
government, whereas so many New Deal programs were based upon earlier state 
programs.41 The Federal Transient Program is also contrasted with programs like the 
Works Progress Administration and the Old Age Security provision of the Social Security 
Act. Unlike these later New Deal programs, these historians contend, the Federal 
Transient Program had little to do with breadwinning.42 Contrary to these assertions, I 
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argue the transient program relied heavily upon the infrastructure, bureaucracy, and 
casework methodologies created by agencies like the Bureau in order to operate 
effectively.43 It is therefore not exactly correct that the Federal Transient Program 
reflected a radical departure from previous welfare provision. Not only was the program 
rooted in the work of private welfare agencies that served unattached men, but its work 
was grounded in a traditional understanding of male gender identity. Although the 
Federal Transient Program served a non-breadwinning population, these men were 
defined by their negative relation to the ideal.             
 By bringing casework principles infused with a vision of manhood that stressed 
family life as an essential component of a man’s life, the Bureau for Homeless Men made 
significant alterations in the relief system established for homeless men. Chapter one 
examines the Bureau’s early work, between 1925 and 1931, as it sought to establish itself 
as a professional social work agency for homeless men. These early programs show how 
the Bureau transformed relief for homeless men in St. Louis from a system of mass care 
into one focused upon individualized casework. The Bureau’s conception of manhood 
both spurred these transformations and structured the shape of its new programs. The 
second chapter explores the Bureau’s work with boys between the ages of fourteen and 
twenty one. This program sought to fill a hole in St. Louis’ relief network by creating a 
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program that would serve homeless, unattached boys that were too old to be assisted by 
the city’s children’s agencies. The Bureau believed that its work with boys represented its 
best opportunity to help its clients achieve its masculine ideal. The final chapter examines 
the Bureau’s role in the establishment of the New Deal’s Federal Transient Program in 
Missouri. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance of private welfare agencies to 
the development of the Federal Transient Program and also provide an explanation for 
the program’s demise. This chapter argues that the decision to defund and dismember the 
transient program was rooted in the assumption that married men with dependents, not 
unattached men, were worthy of public funding. Following the dissolution of the program 
in 1935, it would be much more difficult to operate as a welfare agency serving 
homeless, unattached men.  
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Chapter One: “When a Man Needs a Pilot”  
 Harry’s mother worked as a prostitute, and he suspected that she was attempting 
to introduce his fifteen year old sister Mary into the profession. “An impetuous young 
man,” Harry tried to save Mary. Harry broke into the room where his mother and Mary 
lived, a fight ensued, the police arrived, and Harry’s mother had him arrested. The police 
released Harry shortly after, but much to his chagrin his sister was placed in a home for 
delinquent girls. Estranged from his family and in need of help, Harry went to the Bureau 
for Homeless Men, a professional casework agency for single, unattached men. Harry 
told his caseworker the events of his life and how he bounced around from one job to 
another “dissatisfied and restless.” The caseworker surmised that Harry’s troubled youth 
contributed to his present situation. Harry’s caseworker arranged for him to have a 
medical examination, where the doctor discovered that Harry’s constant headaches 
resulted from improper eye wear. Harry received new glasses, which led him to break 
fewer dishes in the restaurant where he worked. This improved Harry’s relationship with 
his boss, who soon after permitted Harry to tinker with his radio, one of Harry’s interests. 
Harry soon began to attend a night school for radio operating and he later secured an 
eighteen dollar a week job at a radio shop. The Bureau found that, because of its 
casework, Harry became “practically self-supporting” and, with the money he earned 
from his new job, looked forward to the day when he could reunite with his sister.44  
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 For Bureau for Homeless Men to be successful helping men like Harry, it needed 
to professionalize relief for unattached men. For the Bureau, professionalization entailed 
providing individualized, casework services to clients. When the Bureau began 
conducting casework interviews in 1925, the links between its status as a social work 
agency, its understanding of manhood, and its ability to transform unattached men into 
family men had not been fully developed. While the Bureau entered social work at a high 
point in the profession’s development, little had been accomplished in applying the tenets 
of casework to unattached men.45 A contemporary sociologist observed that, because 
unattached men had often been denied help, they had to resort to “nefarious devices” to 
survive.46 The Bureau argued that some caseworkers found the single man “disturbing” 
because he “did not respond to social therapy” and he therefore symbolized an 
“embarrassment that they wished to dispense with.”47 The Charity Organization Society, 
for example, advocated hard labor and even lifetime segregation in labor colonies for 
beggars and tramps.48 Less harshly, lodging houses provided men with food and shelter, 
while others received a train ticket to the next town.49 The Bureau, however, argued that 
hard labor and segregation would not repair a man’s relationship with his family, the true 
root of his problems. The Bureau even felt that the attitudes of other caseworkers toward 
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the unattached man prevented it from becoming “an acceptable agency in the eyes of 
other organizations.”50 The Bureau for Homeless Men would forge the links between its 
professional abilities and its vision of manhood by transforming St. Louis’ Municipal 
Lodging House into a site of casework, constructing an expansive cafeteria program, and 
creating a casework program for beggars. Helping an unattached man discover his 
potential as a family man, or simply reconnecting a man estranged from his family, 
served as the Bureau’s primary purpose in these projects.     
 While the Bureau faced many challenges, the municipal government helped to at 
least establish a basic infrastructure within which the Bureau would eventual operate. 
This is particularly evident with St. Louis’ Municipal Lodging House. The city opened 
the lodging house in 1912 and it served as a home for destitute men during the cold 
winter months. Before the city opened the Municipal Lodging House, the Provident 
Association, a private family casework agency, operated a lodging house and lumber yard 
that provided men food and shelter in exchange for chopping wood. The Provident 
Association closed its lodging house when the city opened its own, arguing that its 
services were no longer needed. The Provident Association underestimated the problem. 
Men from “all points of the compass” flocked to the city’s lodging house soon after it 
opened for shelter, coffee, and a little bit of food. On one particularly cold January day, 
for example, over one thousand men applied. The city recognized the extent of the 
problem and appropriated a five thousand dollar emergency fund to supply extra food and 
clothing for the lodging house during particularly cold periods.  
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Although caseworkers established the Bureau as an ostensibly private agency, the 
publicly funded lodging house provided it with a base of operations. When the Bureau 
began operating in 1925, the city provided the Bureau with free office space for 
caseworkers in the lodging house. The city also paid its electricity bill and the salary of 
one clerical worker. Most importantly, the lodging house assisted in centralizing 
destitute, unattached men, providing the Bureau with the perfect site to conduct casework 
investigations.51 Homeless men could seek shelter from a variety of places, but the size of 
the lodging house, the fact that a bed cost nothing, and the lure of food ensured that it 
would serve as a draw to the region’s transient population. In spite of the many benefits 
afforded the Bureau by the lodging house, the organization’s caseworkers found its 
patrons deficient in their manhood and in need of help.  
 The caseworkers at the Bureau for Homeless Men almost wholly depicted the 
men who stayed at the lodging house, and the men they helped generally, in terms of their 
remoteness from the ideal of a breadwinning family man. The Bureau defined the 
homeless single man as one “without home ties as well as men who are temporarily or 
permanently detached from their families.” To be homeless, then, was not necessarily to 
be without a home, just without a family. For the Bureau, it did not matter why or how a 
man became homeless because his alienation from family life provided the answer to 
those questions. Rather, the Bureau worried more about “the stage of deterioration 
reached”, that is, the unattached man’s distance from the family man ideal. The Bureau 
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argued that homelessness condemned a man “to an existence so inconsistent with his 
capacity for social relationships…as to produce an abnormal individual.” Prolonged 
homelessness almost precluded the promise of casework. The Bureau’s first report stated, 
“This characteristic of detachment is probably the most outstanding difficulty in dealing 
with the men. There seems to be nothing to take hold of in order to begin tying them up 
to a normal family existence. They have so little to live for, so little wish to change their 
ways.” While homelessness damaged the individual man, “the group to suffer most is the 
family.” Homelessness hurt the man’s existing family and, because he probably remained 
unmarried, he destroyed “the possibility of a home that might have been established.” 
These appeals to the sanctity of the family enforced the Bureau’s belief that unattached 
men needed casework. Not only did homelessness hurt the man almost beyond help, but 
it damaged the family as well. Furthermore, by appealing to the family, the Bureau could 
legitimize its work within the field of professional social work.52  
 The Bureau’s insistence upon the gendered distinction between unattached men 
and family men also makes visible class cleavages as well. The Bureau’s clients derived 
overwhelmingly from the working class. As one historian has argued, working class, 
unattached men developed their own ethic of manhood from their experiences on the job 
and on the road. In contrast, the Bureau’s persistent invocation of the family model 
expressed the white collar ideal of men and women forming companionate marriages. 
Furthermore, the college education of the caseworkers significantly distanced them 
socially from their clients. Frank Bruno, a caseworker at the Bureau and a social work 
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academic, admitted as much when he stated, “the social worker’s experience of family 
habits in his own circle…had given him no knowledge of it [the experience of men 
deserting their families].” Bruno’s depiction of his own background emphasized the 
harmony of middle class life in contrast to the disunity of working class families. It 
suggested that the working class would benefit from adopting the values and habits of the 
middle class. Casework served as the Bureau’s tool in this struggle to extend its values.53 
The Bureau’s perceptions of class and gender divisions shaped the way it approached its 
clients. The homeless man’s difficulties derived not from problems associated with 
cyclical unemployment, but rather inhered in the individual homeless man and resulted 
from that man’s inability to achieve a particular ideal.     
 The Bureau’s statistical reports construct a different image of the homeless man 
and suggest that the men the Bureau cared for had problems at least as serious as their 
disengagement from their families. In other words, the statistics collected by the Bureau 
demonstrate some distance between the manifestations of poverty, and the Bureau’s 
largely gendered understanding of its origins. Assertions can only be made concerning 
the men at the lodging house who applied to receive casework from a Bureau social 
worker. Fortunately, the Bureau maintained good statistical records of the men that 
received its services. The Bureau characterized the first thousand men it helped at the 
lodging house as mostly white, native born, unskilled, and transient for at least part of 
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their lives. Fifty-six percent had recently worked in Missouri, while the rest had worked 
predominately around the Midwest. As time passed, the Bureau served more men who 
had been in St. Louis longer than a year. In 1926, sixty-three percent of the Bureau’s 
clients had been in the city less than one year, while forty-percent had been in the city 
less than one week. By 1930, fifty percent of their clientele lived in St. Louis longer than 
a year, while only twenty-seven percent had been in the city less than a week. This 
suggests that jobs transients traditionally performed were no longer available so men 
travelled less frequently, and that poverty increased in St. Louis as the 1920s progressed. 
Furthermore, many were old and sick: forty percent of the men who applied were over 
fifty. While some statistics for 1931 suggest that the Bureau began to serve a younger 
population, the age breakdown described above remained generally the same from 1926 
through 1930. Thirty-six percent of the men were disabled in some way. If one followed 
the Bureau’s principles and counted each man over sixty as essentially disabled, which in 
this instance meant unemployable, then fifty-seven percent of the first group of men were 
disabled.54  
 Although the lodging house served as an indispensable tool, the Bureau argued 
that the operations of the lodging house before 1925 demanded transformation because it 
merely perpetuated a lifestyle for unattached men that the Bureau opposed. Although the 
Municipal Lodging House served as an excellent base for the Bureau to begin its 
operations, the new social work agency would have found a number of features of the 
lodging house deleterious to a man’s life. As Frank Bruno complained, “lodging houses 
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do not make any further attempt to understand and deal with the social problems [i.e. the 
man’s relation to his family] of homelessness.” Even worse, the average man at the 
lodging had ample opportunity to consort and befriend other unattached men, forming 
relationships that the Bureau would have perceived as sustaining the unattached, 
unnatural lifestyle. Bureau caseworkers also worried about the connections between poor 
housing and sexual impropriety. As we shall see, the Bureau had its own concerns about 
sexual deviance among unattached men, fears that reflected long held associations 
between these men and homosexuality. Finally, the lodging house generally served food 
of an extremely low quality. Compounding the poor quality of the diet, men generally 
only consumed 750 calories per day. This system essentially necessitated that men take 
their meals elsewhere, which proved problematic. Given the man’s level of income, in 
order to supplement his meals he needed to beg, an act the Bureau condemned as 
unbecoming of a true men.55   
 Shortly after establishing itself at the lodging house, the Bureau formed a Lodging 
House Committee consisting of representatives from the city and the Bureau to institute 
reforms. The new rules manifested the connections between duty to family, health and 
cleanliness, and work in the Bureau’s conception of manhood. First, the committee 
enacted stricter registration rules. On the first night of a man’s stay, he provided his 
information to a clerk who would in turn give him a ticket for fumigation and a bath. To 
fumigate, the Bureau placed the man’s clothing in “an air-tight room” and sprayed it with 
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flour sulfur. This supplemented the Bureau’s use of cyanide gas to kill vermin within the 
lodging house. On the man’s second night, he received a vaccination, probably for 
tuberculosis. If a man desired to stay longer than three days, he had to visit a caseworker 
to determine his need. The caseworker used this interview to determine if a man had 
family connections to which he might turn. The Bureau repeated this process every thirty 
days to keep updated records of the man’s life and his progress.56 
 With these new rules, the Bureau had effectively transformed the lodging house 
from a place where men could stay to avoid harsh weather to a site that stressed casework 
and rehabilitation. The new rules dictated that, if asked, a man would be required to work 
to continue staying at the lodging house. The caseworker conducted interviews to assess a 
man’s ability to work. Should he be determined as able-bodied and yet refuse to work, his 
stay at the lodging house would be terminated. Of the four hundred extensions granted in 
February 1928, able-bodied men received one hundred eight-five. To be sure, this 
emphasis on work was probably more rhetoric than reality, as the Bureau did not develop 
a work program until 1932.  Finally, if a man returned to the lodging house within thirty 
days of his past stay, this suggested that something might be wrong with him, and the 
Bureau mandated a casework interview before he could be registered again. Perhaps most 
importantly, the new rules reveal tensions in the Bureau’s navigation between its desire to 
conduct casework, that is, to further its own professional goals, and meeting the needs of 
the men they sought to serve, ostensibly one of its other aims. The new rules demonstrate 
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that the Bureau would help a man meet his needs only insofar as that man followed the 
Bureau’s casework agenda.57   
 Although the Bureau had at least formally transformed the lodging house into a 
site of casework, the social workers argued that the lodging house had a number of 
inadequacies that made their job difficult to perform. The lodging house would remain a 
crucial aspect of the Bureau’s relief network, but the social workers desired an office 
dedicated purely to casework that would permit them to better perform their jobs. Many 
caseworkers complained about the actual physical space of the lodging house itself. For 
example, the cramped conditions of the lodging house office often precluded privacy 
between the caseworker and the client, a crucial element for helping meet the individual 
needs of each man. Not all the caseworker’s grievances centered on their inability to do 
good casework at the lodging house. For example, the office had only one small 
bathroom, “which opens only into the main office.” This, combined with the 
“disagreeable odor” present in the summer and the “draft from the kitchen that…gives an 
unpleasant odor” in the office, made the caseworkers quite uncomfortable.58  
 Most importantly, the new casework office provided the Bureau a place to which 
it could send the men who it felt could best be helped by its services, a space in which the 
Bureau could both cultivate and demonstrate its professional acumen. The conditions at 
the lodging house, and some of the men who stayed there, appear to have imperiled the 
reputation of the Bureau as a professional casework agency. The caseworkers argued for 
the necessity of a new office because many of the men who stayed at the lodging house 
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might “increase a sense of failure and despondency” in the Bureau’s more respectable 
clients, and therefore prevent the Bureau from performing effective casework. The 
reputation of the lodging house within the city also prevented the Bureau from 
interviewing and aiding all the unattached men it might have. As one board member of 
the Bureau complained, some in St. Louis perceived the residents of the lodging house as 
mere “tramps and bums” and refused to send men there who needed help. By establishing 
its new branch office outside of the neighborhood of the lodging house, the Bureau 
created a purer space, a place where casework could operate unimpeded by the 
unchangeable deviance and corruption of some of the men at the lodging house. This 
move therefore marked some men as outside the Bureau’s professional ability to help.59  
 By the end of 1930, the Bureau managed to establish two casework centers, one at 
the lodging house and one at their new office, yet the caseworkers began to notice that 
their clients abused their system of feeding them. The Bureau’s solution to this problem, 
the problem of feeding its clients, challenged it emphasis on individual casework. For 
most of this period, the Bureau fed its clients in two different ways. First, the Bureau 
used the lodging house to feed the men staying there. The Bureau’s primary feeding 
problems derived the Bureau’s use of contracted restaurants to provide for its clients. To 
do this, the Bureau purchased “meal tickets” from each restaurant, good for either one 
meal, an entire day’s worth of meals, or a week’s worth of meals. Caseworkers would 
then distribute these meal tickets to their clients.60 Walter Hoy, the Bureau’s first 
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executive secretary, provided the compelling logic behind this restaurant system: “The 
greatest value in caring for homeless men on the outside is to retain…as far as possible, 
the normal outlook on life…” The Bureau hoped, then, to not only provide casework 
services to the men, but to allow them some measure of independence that any healthy, 
breadwinning family man would exercise in his daily life. The results of Hoy’s noble 
experiment, however, would not be those that he desired.61         
 The Bureau stopped feeding men through the use of contracted restaurants 
because its clients abused the system in a multitude of ways. First, men often sold their 
meal tickets. The Bureau found this problematic because it brought men into its network 
without them first seeing a caseworker. Similarly, men often used their tickets to feed 
others. Part of the problem also stemmed from the restaurant owners. Some owners sold 
the men alcohol, a substance that the Bureau viewed as particularly dangerous for 
unattached men. The Bureau also blamed some restaurants that served St. Louis’ black 
community for artificially increasing the number of black men who visited the Bureau, 
men who the Bureau felt had plenty of support and therefore merely abused the system: 
“Naturally every [black] man...would apply for a Bureau meal ticket whether they needed 
one or not.” The restaurant system therefore foiled the Bureau’s attempts to turn 
unattached, deviant men, into virtuous breadwinning family men. To be sure, there was 
nothing in itself wrong about selling a meal ticket for cash, although prohibition was still 
in effect. Instead the problem derived from the man’s refusal to follow the dictates of his 
caseworker. This proved so problematic for the caseworkers because they believed they 
understood how respectable men should act, and to not follow their prescriptions was a 
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serious transgression. The Bureau sought to remedy this system by expanding its in-
house feeding operation.62  
 The Bureau reached the paradoxical conclusion that, in order to assist men as 
individuals, it would have to abandon its efforts to treat them like individuals. To prevent 
men from acting unmanly, the Bureau would have to open its own cafeteria that could 
feed men on a mass scale. This reversion to feeding on a mass scale would seem to 
undermine the Bureau’s stated emphasis of using individualized casework to rehabilitate 
unattached men into family men. Indeed, the Bureau calculated that with its new cafeteria 
set-up, it would be able to pass twenty men through the kitchen line in one minute. 
However, the Bureau insisted that this new system actually helpful its casework efforts 
because it gave caseworkers “full control over all men eating at the cafeteria.” This 
enlarged supervision proved to be necessary in light of the rampant abuses perpetrated by 
the men in the old restaurant system. The Bureau gave out tickets that were good for 
three weeks’ worth of meals; after that the man would need to revisit his caseworker and 
establish his need for another ticket.63  
 The restaurant episode reveals that the importance of the caseworker’s 
prescriptions for their client’s life, that is, their professional prerogative, trumped the 
sense of independence that the caseworkers hoped to cultivate in their clients. In 
explaining this new system, Myron Gwinner, the Bureau’s executive secretary after June 
1932, expressly stated that the Bureau never gave out blocks of cafeteria tickets to be 
distributed on the street because then the caseworkers “would not be able to follow our 
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casework procedure of careful investigation and provision of the things required by each 
individual man.” If a man arrived at the cafeteria seeking food without a ticket, he would 
be denied service until he reported to the casework office to “tell his story to one of the 
social workers there.” In other words, the Bureau now felt that the restaurant system 
provided too much independence to men, a concern that would also be evident in the 
Bureau’s anti-begging work.64   
 The creation of the Citizens’ Anti-Begging Committee was the Bureau’s most 
important and revealing intervention into the St. Louis relief set-up for unattached men. 
Before the Bureau formed the Citizens’ Anti-Begging Committee, police simply arrested 
and fined beggars and then sent them to the workhouse. The Bureau saw this method as 
inadequate because it merely imprisoned the beggar for a short time and did nothing to 
try to reconnect the man with family. The Bureau therefore grounded its anti-begging 
activities in the casework method. Through casework, the Bureau hoped to transform the 
beggar into a better man. Beggars had an incentive to utilize the services of the Bureau: 
by accepting casework, beggars would be allowed to forgo time in the workhouse. This 
was an entirely novel approach to dealing with the beggar. Observers from the field of 
social work such as Robert Wilson, president of the Family Welfare Association of 
America, lauded the anti-begging work of the Bureau as a standard for other social 
workers to follow.65   
 Caseworkers at the Bureau particularly despised begging because it symbolized a 
personal affront to their status as professional caseworkers. According to the Bureau, 
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begging precluded the social worker’s attempts to do their job. Instead of seeing begging 
as a pragmatic tool for survival, the Bureau believed that begging allowed a man to live 
off an illegitimate source of income that led him further toward degeneracy and away 
from the family man ideal.66 From the perspective of the man picked up by a cop or 
caseworker, begging could have been a legitimate tactic used to supplement a meager 
income. The Bureau admitted as much when it bemoaned the fact that railroad workers, 
while stopped over in St. Louis, occasionally begged to make extra money, even if it 
were only for “good times” like drinking and paying for prostitutes. Mostly, Bureau 
caseworkers ignored the beggar’s own justification or need for begging, and instead saw 
the decision to beg, made either by a first time offender or a man who quit their casework 
program to continue begging, as evidence of a maladjusted male. 67 
 Like the support the Bureau received from the Municipal Lodging House, a 
number of municipal laws also bolstered the Bureau’s attempts to professionalize work 
with beggars. For example, the St. Louis vagrancy law of 1879 criminalized begging. The 
law drew a wide circumference around the notion of a vagrant. It included any man 
“without any visible means of support…engaged in practicing any trick or device to 
procure money or other thing of value…and every able bodied married man who shall 
neglect or refuse to provide for the support of his family, and every person found 
tramping without any visible means of support.” The punishment for vagrancy in St. 
Louis included a twenty day jail term, a fine of twenty dollars, or both. When the Bureau 
began its anti-begging activities, the punishment had grown more severe: the fine 
increased to one hundred dollars, and if the vagrant could not pay the fine, the 
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punishment required a thirty-three day term in the workhouse. Casework treatment could 
serve as a substitute for a fine and time in the workhouse. Thus, similar to the lodging 
house, the use of the vagrancy law to apprehend beggars in the 1920s provided the 
Bureau with a pool of unattached men from which to draw. 68   
 Furthermore, a number of important city functionaries contributed to the 
development and enforcement of the Bureau’s anti-begging plan. St. Louis Mayor Victor 
Miller, the directors of the Public Welfare and Workhouse departments, a few municipal 
judges, and the chief of police were a few of the more notable persons who helped the 
Bureau develop its anti-begging program. The police department augmented the Bureau’s 
work significantly by supplying officers to the Bureau who specifically searched the city 
streets for beggars. The courts agreed to allow casework with a Bureau social worker to 
replace a fine and time served in the workhouse. This partnership between the Bureau for 
Homeless Men, the mayor’s office, and other city institutions probably served each 
interest well, as cooperation continued at least through 1933.69     
 Finally, cooperation with police who patrolled the streets and arrested beggars 
significantly augmented the Bureau’s caseload. For the year 1932, the police supplied the 
Bureau with almost four hundred beggars. From the fifty nine cases analyzed in 1929, at 
least forty four came from the police. The Bureau’s records even suggest that police 
officers in plain clothes were used to arrest beggars. Until 1931 it is unclear how often 
this method of enforcement was used. The use of plain clothes cops appeared in 1926, but 
the Bureau perhaps employed this method only sporadically, particularly during times 
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when the number of beggars on the streets achieved particular heights. According to Isaac 
Gurman, the Bureau’s third executive secretary, the addition of a plain clothes cop “did a 
great deal to cut down this close cooperation with the Police Department” because the 
police department shifted all anti-begging work to this officer, making other officers feel 
like they did not need to contribute. However, this cannot be true given the extent of 
police cooperation that is evident in many of the reports. To be sure, Gurman could be 
correct if other reports could demonstrate that police cooperation accounted for an even 
larger amount of the Bureau’s beggar caseload before the use of the plain clothes officer. 
Unfortunately, these reports for the Citizen’s Anti-Begging Committee are lost. 70 
 On paper, the outline of the plan that would guide the Bureau’s anti-begging 
activities appeared to be fairly simple. First, the police would “arrest all those found 
begging upon the streets.” Next, the beggar would be fined by the courts and sent to the 
workhouse. The police then notified the Bureau of the new case, and a caseworker would 
then visit the workhouse to interview the beggar and create a treatment plan. If the beggar 
accepted the treatment plan he would be released from the workhouse and placed in the 
care of the Bureau. If the beggar failed to follow through with the treatment plan, he 
would simply be sent back to the workhouse.71 
 In practice, the plan proved to be more complicated. The anti-begging plan 
brought the Bureau much closer to acting as an appendage of the public sphere because it 
essentially deputized caseworkers as patrolmen for the streets and as probation officers 
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for beggars. The activities of the Bureau’s special caseworker for the anti-begging 
department, who walked the streets in search of beggars to bring back to the Bureau, 
significantly supplemented the committee’s caseload. In March 1932, for example, the 
caseworker brought in thirty three of the fifty eight new cases. For the entire year 1932, 
the caseworker apprehended two hundred sixty of the five hundred thirty six beggars. 
One can only imagine how the caseworker convinced the beggar to come with him to the 
casework office. Other times the beggar would voluntarily seek out seek out the Bureau’s 
help. Furthermore, the courts rarely appear to have sent the beggar to the workhouse, 
choosing instead to immediately parole them to the Bureau. Not only did this help reduce 
the number of cases that the courts saw everyday, but it provided a legal sheen for the 
enforcement of a policy that existed somewhere between the correctional system and 
private welfare.72  
    The selection of caseworkers at the Anti-Begging Committee reveals the 
importance that the Bureau attached to having male caseworkers helping men. The 
Bureau’s emphasis on casework with beggars, as with all its clients, required a workforce 
of trained social workers. The maintenance of an all male workforce, given the popularity 
of social work as a career with women, would have been very difficult. As the make-up 
of the staff of the Anti-Begging Committee demonstrates, the Bureau attempted to have 
as many male caseworkers as possible. For the first three years of the anti-begging 
program, the Bureau utilized many caseworkers from other agencies in the city. Some of 
these caseworkers had undoubtedly been women. By 1928, the relief loads of the other 
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social agencies expanded, and they could no longer afford to supply the Anti-Begging 
Committee with caseworkers and still adequately tend to their own caseloads. The 
Bureau replaced them with an “experienced caseworker who [could] devote his time to 
the beggar problem.” The Bureau hired a man, T.A. Hendricks, to partially fill in this 
position, but others would of course be needed. Hendricks graduated from the Louisville 
School of Social Work and practiced casework for three years before being hired by the 
Bureau. By 1932, the Bureau hired S.E. Albrecht, another male, as a caseworker to the 
Anti-Begging Committee. While Albrecht only took courses at the Washington 
University School of Social Work, he had experience in boy’s work with the Y.M.C.A. 
The Bureau would no doubt have had a relatively easy time finding experienced female 
case workers, but it chose men instead. This suggests that the Bureau believed that men, 
albeit trained and professional, could better understand and help other men. The Bureau’s 
desire to hire as many men as possible also suggests the limits of its distaste for the 
homosocial lifestyle of unattached men. As long as these men sought help from 
professional men, homosocial interaction could be sanctioned.73  
 In order to better understand and help its clients, the Bureau developed an 
elaborate system to catalogue and categorize its beggar clients. The Bureau used a three 
tiered taxonomical system to categorize the various character types of its beggar clients: 
professional, occasional, and beginner. A professional “made a living by this means.” 
The occasional beggar “considers begging a deviation from his normal mode of living” 
and “has other sources of income such as odd jobs.” The beginning beggar is either a first 
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offender or one for whom “the habit of begging is not fixed.” The various practices 
employed by beggars, be they professional, occasional, or beginner, varied significantly, 
and would determine their place in even more specialized categories. A beggar could be 
picked up by the police or a Bureau caseworker for any one of the following activities: 
playing street music, peddling, letter writing, “mooching”, or panhandling. According to 
the extant records, moochers, who earned their living by asking for handouts on the 
street, outranked all other types of beggars treated by the Bureau. Of the two hundred 
thirty one begging cases handled by caseworkers from May to July in 1931, the Bureau 
classified fifty three percent as moochers. The annual report of the Anti-Begging 
Committee for 1932 showed that out of 1,771 begging cases, eighty two percent 
mooched.74  
 The Bureau argued that the desire to deceive best characterized the beggar, 
regardless of his status as a moocher, peddler, or panhandler. The Bureau’s understanding 
of street peddlers provides an interesting example of the way that their perception of 
beggars as deceitful shaped its work. The primary problem with peddlers stemmed from 
their ostensible legitimacy. Bureau case workers or cops on the beat could not easily 
distinguish peddlers that lawfully used their permits from peddlers who used permits to 
disguise their begging lifestyle. One Bureau report stated that, “The professional peddlers 
are the most difficult beggars. They surround themselves with the habiliments and 
merchandise of honest peddlers, thus making their conviction doubtful.” The prominence 
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of street peddling during the Great Depression made this particularly problematic. The 
Bureau certainly found troubling the publicity campaign launched by the Globe 
Democrat and St. Louis Post Dispatch during the winter of 1931, urging people to buy 
apples from street peddlers to assuage the unemployment problem. Even Mayor Miller, 
who helped formulate the Bureau’s anti-begging policy, proclaimed a week in February 
to be “apple week.” The Bureau needed to devise a test for identifying both honest 
peddlers and deceitful beggars. “The peddler may or may not have a license to peddle, 
but the test is that while displaying his wares, he does not make [an] exchange [of goods] 
for money received and generally confines his efforts to attempts to create pity rather 
than really selling his goods.” The amount of surveillance that this test would require 
undoubtedly prohibited it from being widely implemented, yet it nicely illustrates the 
point that, although the Bureau sought to help unattached men, it treated many of them 
with extreme suspicion.75          
 Bureau caseworkers also suspected that many beggars used disabilities to deceive 
passersby into providing alms. As we have seen already, the Bureau catalogued and 
discussed a wide variety of disabilities, ranging from physical disabilities to 
psychological maladies. Because only select records survive, it is difficult to determine 
exactly how many beggars had disabilities. Monthly and annual reports are sporadic, and 
the special reports analyzed select cases. The extant records of the Citizen’s Anti-
Begging Committee are inconclusive. They show that anywhere between ten and fifty 
percent of its clients had disabilities. The committee’s annual report for 1932 provided 
the most exhaustive list of disabilities. Disabilities were catalogued with illness as well, 
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and listed under the general rubric “Problems”. The Bureau counted common disabilities 
such as deafness and blindness, along with a more eclectic mix of problems. Problems 
like “mental,” “nervousness,” “hunchback,” “chronic gonorrhea,” and “right leg 1” 
shorter than left” illustrate the depth, breadth, and detail of the caseworker’s 
investigations into their client’s lives.76 Despite the very real material manifestations of 
these disabilities, the Bureau still considered it to be one aspect of the beggar’s deceitful 
character: “As you would expect, beggars as a group have serious mental and physical 
difficulties as they take very little care of themselves, often owing to the fact that this 
physical disability is a help in their business rather than a handicap.” This play on words 
demonstrates the depth of degeneration that the Bureau believed begging and the 
unattached lifestyle inflicted upon men. Deceit and disability reinforced one another, and 
the depraved transformations they elicited in men underscored the urgency and necessity 
of the Bureau’s anti-begging policies. Furthermore, the Bureau’s discussion of disability 
illuminates boundaries between its understanding of proper manhood and the illegitimate 
manhood of it clients.77  
 In order to properly combat begging, the Bureau would need cooperation from the 
citizenry of St. Louis, those who supplied the beggars with money. In fact, the Bureau 
viewed the average citizen, the social worker, and the client enveloped in a triangular 
relationship. Frank Bruno argued that the specialization of relief led to the 
“dehumanization of the average man” because this average person no longer took part in 
the process of relief. The Bureau wanted a citizenry that not only believed in its anti-
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begging policy but also assisted in the enforcement of that policy by not providing alms 
to street beggars and recommending them to the Bureau instead. By involving the 
“normal” citizen in its professionalized relief efforts, the Bureau sought to cause an 
adjustment in them by acquainting them with how modern, professionalized societies 
work.78  
 To ensure the cooperation of the citizens of St. Louis, the Bureau attempted to 
educate them on the necessity of arresting beggars and providing them with casework 
services. The Bureau brought to the public its view of beggars as deceitful half-men 
whose lifestyle threatened family and the community, a threat that could only be stopped 
by submitting beggars to casework. This campaign reached its height in the winter of 
1928 and 1929, when the Bureau distributed 12,000 pamphlets titled “Three Things a 
Policeman Doesn’t Like to Do”, and gave speeches at clubs, schools, and on the radio. 
The rhetoric used by the Bureau in these pamphlets and speeches is in many ways more 
damning than the understanding of beggars cultivated privately in reports and during 
meetings. In its publicity campaigns, the Bureau followed the pattern set by the tramp 
ethnographers of the early twentieth century who used publicly disseminated narratives to 
help define the contours of class and respectable manhood. The Bureau’s publicity 
campaign went a step further, however, and instead of merely portraying beggars and 
tramps as degraded men, the Bureau argued for its ability to rehabilitate these men into 
breadwinning, family oriented males.79   
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 The pamphlet “There are Three Things a Policeman Doesn’t Like to Do” urged 
readers to help beggars not by giving them money, but by donating to the Community 
Fund, the network of private agencies to which the Bureau belonged, and the Bureau 
itself because, “the law and the policeman can’t cure this evil unaided.” The pamphlet 
stated that “Beggars will stay on our streets as long as the public makes it profitable” and 
that “public cooperation, by giving not where it will hurt but where it will help, will make 
the forces against the pitiful and demoralizing habit of begging 100 percent strong.” The 
Bureau’s exhortations went one step further, urging readers to help the beggar “by 
reporting him to the police.” To convince the reader of the pamphlet to donate, the 
Bureau demonized the beggar and touted its ability to provide the kind of care that 
beggars actually required.80 
 This pamphlet defined the beggar as a deceitful man who feigned disability to 
cheat the public and it introduced the idea of a “professional” beggar working as part of 
an organized network. The pamphlet began by describing a policeman as he “pointed 
down the sidewalk to a piece of human wreckage seated alongside a building” peddling 
his wares. The policeman hesitated to arrest the beggar because “The last time he arrested 
a beggar a crowd gathered while he was awaiting the patrol wagon and insulting remarks 
were made.” The policeman wanted to tell the crowd that by arresting the beggar he 
would be doing the beggar and the community a service. “Perhaps”, the writer of the 
pamphlet mused, “as happened the other day in St. Louis, if the cripple had suddenly 
proved himself a faker by sprinting away like a college athlete, the crowd might have 
changed its attitude.” The Bureau argued that beggars threatened the quality of St. Louis 
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as a city. By donating to the Bureau “the wily professionals will be weeded out and these 
will be the first to depart for ‘healthier’ climes, reporting the fact that St. Louis is not the 
‘easy’ place it is considered by the footloose.” Thus, the caseworker and the Bureau not 
only assisted the beggar, but they helped the city clean up its image as well.81    
 The Bureau also sought to spread its message through public speeches. Only one 
speech transcript has survived, but it is perhaps more alarmist than the pamphlet and 
presented listeners with a distilled version of the Bureau’s perception of beggars. A 
crucial component of the speech was providing examples of beggars unmasked by the 
Bureau as deceitful in order to demonstrate how begging prevented men from performing 
their proper duties. For example, the Bureau apparently revealed through casework one 
man, “Mr. Jones,” to be an owner of real estate in both St. Louis and Houston, and a 
descendent of a slave owner who owned “thousands of acres of land around Houston…” 
The Bureau presented Mr. Jones as a degenerate man whose improper habits the public 
supported: “Were the people who gave to Mr. Jones…helping him or were they 
contributing to the worry of his working wife and making it possible for him to be away 
from home and on the streets?” The most obnoxious fact about Mr. Jones’ life concerned 
his marriage to a woman who worked “in one of our largest factories.” Instead of 
working to support his wife, Mr. Jones’ wife worked to support him. Mr. Jones subverted 
almost all the roles that the Bureau believed men should fill, including the most important 
of all, happily supporting a family of dependents.82     
 More than the pamphlet, this speech described the harmful effects that providing 
spare change to beggars had on his manly character. The denigrations discussed by the 
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Bureau harkened back to past characterizations that had their origins in the “discovery” 
of the tramp in the 1870s. The list serves as a counterpoint to the Bureau’s manly ideal: 
“irresponsibility, idleness, independence of movement, and satisfaction that wants no 
interference.” Begging subverted a man’s virtuousness because “a premium is placed 
upon deceit.” By giving money to beggars, one only “encourages the habit and confirms 
them in their hope that they can make a living without work.” Furthermore, the Bureau 
explained the habit of begging as something that was almost hereditary: “Begging breeds 
its kind through example, training, and through the use of children. Wrong habits of 
thought and work are created; ideals of self respect and useful citizenship are destroyed. 
Children are kept out of school while their parents are at home…” Begging therefore not 
only destroyed manly character, it also imperiled women, children, and families. 
Although the speech painted a bleak picture, the speaker held out hope: “For twentieth 
century society to assume that there is no alternative for begging…is erroneous.” The 
alternative, of course, was casework. The speech ended: “Public cooperation, by not 
giving where it will hurt, but by reporting the beggar to the police, will make the forces 
against the pitiful and demoralizing habit of begging 100 percent strong.”83  
 The record of the Bureau’s anti-begging work demonstrates that the casework 
process required considerable interventions into the lives of unattached men. However 
the beggar came to be known to the Bureau, the process always began with an interview. 
During the interview, the caseworker sought to understand many personal details of the 
beggar’s life: family history, work record, physical conditions, interests, sex life, mental 
health, and record of vagrancy or delinquency. Caseworkers also appear to have 
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conducted fairly significant psychological and physical examinations of beggars, 
illustrated by the following “problems” or “disabilities” some beggars displayed: “sex 
complex”, and “abscess of rectum”. These problems each suggest that the Bureau sought 
to discover any evidence of homosexuality in their clients. The Bureau perceived these 
problems as reinforced by the homeless man’s involvement in a largely all male 
environment. Like disabilities, the Bureau used evidence of male desire to demarcate the 
family man from the non-family man.  
After interviewing the beggar, the caseworker constructed an individual plan, but 
the aims of the plan remained the same. Men could be returned to their families and/or 
provided employment. For non-residents of Missouri, the Bureau attempted to contact the 
beggar’s family and arrange for their return. For the cases that the Bureau deemed a 
success, merely returning a man to his family or helping him find a job did not fulfill the 
Bureau’s professional aspirations; the Bureau desired continuous contact with its clients 
to ensure that the man did not return to the Bureau “in the same condition.”84  
 Narrative descriptions of the casework process in the Citizens’ Anti-Begging 
Committee are rare, but one of the surviving statistical analyses from 1932 further 
demonstrates the intensity of the process for many men. While seven of the fifteen cases 
analyzed only met with one caseworker, the remaining eight met with as many as seven 
different caseworkers, suggesting that the two caseworkers hired by the Bureau 
specifically for anti-begging work often had their work supplemented by others. Four of 
the fifteen men met with caseworkers for less than a month. The majority had cases that 
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last longer than two months, with two men having cases that spanned more than a year. 
Although the first interview was perhaps the most critical, many of the cases analyzed in 
this report went through a series of interviews, ranging anywhere from two to forty two. 
Finally, the caseworker would also make many “field visits” and contact the man’s 
references in order to determine the best way to ensure rehabilitation. Before the Bureau 
intervened in and transformed the relief network for homeless men, these beggars would 
have simply been arrested, fined, and then sent on their way. Now, the Bureau subjected 
beggars and other homeless to casework therapy. What these descriptions of the 
casework process at the Bureau suggest is that these caseworkers sought to be as rigid 
and exacting as their colleagues who conducted casework with single mothers.85            
 Most importantly, the Bureau’s reports show that beggars made it difficult for 
caseworkers to do their job. Of the two hundred thirty one beggar cases analyzed in 1931, 
ninety three were “unwilling to cooperate” and gave “false or insufficient information”. 
Railroad workers, for example, often left town too quickly to permit the caseworker to 
implement their treatment plan. A case file for the Citizens’ Anti-Begging Committee 
demonstrates this point. The police arrested the man for begging and the man served time 
in the workhouse while the caseworker made the initial investigation. The beggar told the 
case worker that he did not mind staying in the workhouse because he expected to be 
reemployed by the grocery store at which he previously worked. When the caseworker 
asked about his past in order to reconnect him with his family, the man told the 
caseworker he had travelled and lived around the Midwest, and that he had “been in the 
Army” in 1918. None of this turned out to be true upon further investigation. The 
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caseworker contacted welfare agencies in Kansas City, Des Moines, and Chicago, along 
with the grocery store that previously employed him, but none of them had heard of this 
man. When the caseworker confronted the beggar with this, he admitted he lied and 
refused to provide any more information. Given his noncooperation, the caseworker 
recommended that the beggar serve the rest of his time in the workhouse.86 
 By 1932, the Bureau for Homeless Men had significantly transformed the way 
unattached men received relief in St. Louis by expanding the reach of professional 
casework services to unattached, homeless men. An important characteristic of this 
transformation is the close cooperation between the Bureau and the city government. In 
other words, the Bureau’s collaboration with the city illuminates some of the contours of 
the associative state in the 1920s.87 While the Bureau was formally a private welfare 
agency, municipal institutions created a network within which the Bureau could work. 
The city provided space for casework and devoted municipal resources to the 
apprehension of beggars. However, the relationship worked the other way as well. The 
Bureau’s work not only reformed some unattached men, it also reformed the city’s 
institutions as well. Crucially, gender and ideal notions of manhood played a motivating 
role in many of these transformations in the associative state. Private welfare agencies 
therefore not only benefited from public infrastructure, it interacted with and transformed 
that infrastructure.  
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 Nonetheless, while Bureau social workers applied casework to unattached men, 
they rationalized it only through reference to the man’s serious deviation from their 
standard of manhood. In other words, there is still significant continuity between the 
Bureau’s work discussed in this chapter and previous ways of understanding the 
unattached man. Like its predecessors, the Bureau continued to demonize its clients, 
made most evident in its publicity campaigns.  The Bureau tapped in to ancient fears of 
the man who did not work to legitimate its activities. This would not have been so 
problematic had the Bureau also articulated a compelling case for why the unattached 
men deserved relief. The Bureau failed to do this. The Bureau even failed to argue that 
these men, who experienced extreme poverty, needed relief. Instead, the Bureau argued 
that what their clients needed was casework, which only they could profitably provide. 
The failure to rationalize its activity in terms of the man’s need or entitlement would later 
hurt the Bureau’s professional prospects. 
 Another important development wrought by the Bureau’s professionalization of 
relief for unattached men included bringing men into its ranks to help other men. While 
the Bureau disavowed homosocial relationships between unattached men, the 
caseworkers believed that their understanding of the proper role for men, as a family man 
and breadwinner, could be transmitted through casework and serve as a suitable template 
for unattached men. The Bureau started with two male caseworkers, and as we have seen, 
it added two more to its anti-begging division. By 1932, the Bureau was employing thirty 
five caseworkers, twenty three of which were men. The importance of finding suitable 
male caseworkers, certainly not the easiest job considering the male-female distribution 
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in the profession, played an especially important role in the subject of the next chapter, 
the Bureau’s work with unattached boys. 88   
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Chapter Two: Boys to Breadwinners  
 In many ways, Geoffrey’s case resembled Harry’s. Geoffrey’s father deserted his 
family and, perhaps out of desperation, his mother turned to prostitution and tried to get 
her daughter involved as well. The authorities were alerted to this disreputable situation 
(although not by Geoffrey, who does not appear to be as “impetuous” as Harry) and the 
case record stated the “the law” broke up the family. Geoffrey, “handicapped with…[a] 
nervous disposition” and with no family to turn to for help, sought refuge at a number of 
relief agencies before being recommended to the “Boys’ Work” division of the Bureau 
for Homeless Men, a special committee dedicated to performing casework with “boys” 
between the ages of fourteen and twenty one. When the Bureau compiled the notes on 
Geoffrey’s case in 1932, it had been working with him for a year and half. The Bureau 
noted that, while Geoffrey was not yet “‘out of the woods’ in social readjustment”, the 
caseworker had made significant strides in Geoffrey’s case. With Geoffrey’s case in 
mind, the caseworker suggested that preachers who employed the metaphor of the “lost 
sheep” in their sermons would do well to look through the records of city casework 
institutions to find concrete examples of “beautiful realities of reclamations.” Reflecting 
the desire to be recognized as professional caseworkers, the record finished by stating 
that the work the Bureau did for boys like Geoffrey could provide citizens with “a new 
and quite attractive slant on their city’s charities.”89       
 As with its program for unattached men, the Bureau endeavored to use 
professional casework grounded in a particular vision of manhood to help unattached 
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boys become family men. The Bureau viewed the abnormality of the unattached boy in 
terms of his detachment from family life. Isaac Gurman, a caseworker at the Bureau, 
contrasted the “normal boy” with its clients. A normal boy had his childhood behind him, 
but could not yet accept the “mature responsibilities of manhood.” Because a healthy 
family, consisting of a mother and father, reared this boy, the Bureau considered him an 
“average normal boy” who would, with time, develop accordingly. Gurman continued, 
“Even a cursory examination…convinces one that our young clients are not normal, 
average boys because the force making for normality, the family group, had in some way 
failed to function properly or did not exist long enough to fulfill its purpose.”90 The 
Bureau asked, how would these boys become men? To aid in the development of these 
boys, the Bureau sought to reunite them with their families. However, because family 
dysfunction often prevented cohesion, and spurred the boy to become unattached, the 
Bureau developed other intensive casework methods to help boys become men. The 
program for unattached boys developed by the Bureau aided boys older than fourteen, 
who were too old for the children’s organizations in the city, and younger than twenty 
one, not quite yet adult men. Thus, while theorists like G. Stanley Hall worried about 
boys this age becoming overly civilized, the Bureau worried that time spent away from 
family created undeveloped men.91   
 To an event greater extent in its boys’ work, the Bureau tied its success as a 
professional casework organization to the importance of employing male caseworkers. 
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The Bureau viewed its work with boys as the organization’s best opportunity to 
demonstrate the acumen of its professional abilities. Boys’ work presented Bureau social 
workers with an opportunity to do “‘casework’ at its best” because the “possibilities for 
turning ‘insolvent personalities’ into permanently solvent ones are far greater among 
boys and young men than anywhere else in the total case load of the Bureau.”92 The 
Bureau argued that, as men, male caseworkers naturally understood the problems of 
unattached boys better than female caseworkers. In order to successfully professionalize, 
the Bureau’s boys’ work program called strictly for a male presence. By insisting on male 
caseworkers, the Bureau’s program for boys serves as a nice companion to the work of 
other historians who have argued for the importance of female gender for social work 
professionalization.93 More importantly, by emphasizing a “natural” connection between 
men and boys, the Bureau’s work demonstrates that masculinity in social work 
professionalization went beyond the mere insistence on “masculine” values like 
objectivity, a concept often employed by female social workers as they sought 
professional status. Instead, the Bureau sought to help boys become men through cross-
class and intergenerational bonds.94    
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 The economic crisis that began in 1929 appears to have served as the impetus for 
the Bureau’s program for boys. Of course, social workers had long concerned themselves 
with providing care for children and youth. Concerns over the young, particularly those 
cared for only by single mothers, served as an impetus for many reformers at the turn of 
the twentieth century.95 A closer analogy to the Bureau’s work with boys might be an 
organization like the Boy Scouts of America. The Boy Scouts used outdoor and team 
activities to build “character” in middle class boys.96 However, the Boy Scouts largely 
served middle class boys, and restricted lower class boys from joining. While lower class 
youth around the turn of the century could join “boys’ clubs,” the directors of these clubs 
sought to pacify the boys, and not necessarily aid in their development.97 As popular 
contemporary books like Thomas Minehan’s Boy and Girl Tramps of America made 
clear, the depression worsened the situation of poor youth and sent many on the road, 
away from their families, looking for something better. Far from being a rite of passage 
into manhood, as some boys perceived their tramping, the Bureau looked upon this 
familial breakdown with horror. Although other organizations of a religious character 
existed in St. Louis to provide shelter and food to boys, none had yet employed the 
precepts of professional social work. As more boys filtered into their network, the Bureau 
began to see them as a special group within the rubric of problems associated with 
unattached men that, through professional casework, might be reconciled.    
 Although the Bureau did not create a formal plan for unattached boys until 1932, 
caseworkers nevertheless kept valuable statistical records on the number of boys that 
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wandered into the Municipal Lodging House and their casework offices. These early 
statistical reports allow us to gain a general understanding of the characteristics of the 
boys who applied to the Bureau. For example, the Bureau tracked each boy’s age, race, 
level of education, job history, disabilities, and hometown. Additionally, the Bureau 
recorded evidence of social maladjustment and the reason(s) why the boy abandoned his 
home. These two categories informed and reinforced one another, and revealed a host of 
characteristics that prevented boys from becoming men. Most importantly, these early 
records reveal that the Bureau thought about its boy clients in ways that mirrored its 
understanding of unattached men. The Bureau viewed these boys as on a developmental 
trajectory that terminated in the deviancy of begging and detachment from family and a 
healthy social life. Because of their youth, the caseworkers at the Bureau desired to 
prevent boys detached from their families from becoming like the multitude of men at the 
lodging house.  
 Early on in the Bureau’s history, the presence of boys appears to have been rather 
slight. Although the number of active cases varied each year, the number of boys always 
remained under ten percent of the total caseload. In 1926, only seven percent of the 
Bureau’s caseload consisted of individuals under twenty. In 1927, that number declined 
even further, falling to merely four and a half percent. In 1928, the number rose to just 
above five percent, only to fall back to an even five percent in 1929 and just over four 
percent in 1930.98 According to the extant records, during some of the spring and summer 
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months the Bureau saw as little as two individuals under twenty.99 During the winter, for 
obvious reasons, the number of boys visiting the shelter did increase, but the proportions 
remained low.100 It is probable that these statistics do not accurately represent the number 
of boys that visited the Bureau. Fearing that they would be sent home if the caseworker 
discovered their youthful age, many boys probably tried to pass as older. These reports 
suggest that the Bureau’s lack of a concrete plan early on is a reflection of the relatively 
small number of boys that actually requested assistance. 
 In 1930, the Bureau reexamined one hundred case records of boys between the 
ages of fourteen and twenty, from the period between February 1925 and April 25, 1930. 
This report perhaps served as one of the first in a fact finding mission about the nature of 
the problem presented by unattached boys. The report suggests that the Bureau would 
have probably viewed the unattached boy as a problem of the white, native born family. 
The Bureau counted over ninety percent of the boys as both “American” and “white”. 
Additionally, only twenty four of the boys came from families where the parents were not 
divorced, separated, or widowed. Astonishingly, twenty five of the cases examined came 
from families where neither parent remained alive.101 This would have no doubt been of 
special concern to the caseworkers at the Bureau because a significant wall in their 
defense against unattached deviancy, the family, had been irreparably breached.  
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 Like their investigations into the lives of adult men, the Bureau looked for the 
“psycho-social” causes of the boys’ present status as unattached.102 The Bureau’s 
discoveries distinguished the normal boy from the abnormal one, and established a list of 
properties that must be transcended for the boy to develop normally. While 
unemployment made up about a third of both the problems and causes of each boy’s 
predicament, this is in itself quite significant. For boys to languish in unemployment, 
away from their families, would be to permit the formation of improper habits. Conflicts 
with parents caused many boys to become homeless, either because the parents 
abandoned the boy or the boy ran away. Repairing these broken family bonds would 
become a crucial goal of the Bureau’s Boy’s Work program.  
 Many of the psycho-social problems the caseworkers discovered in boys express 
the extent to which they related sexual purity and hetero-normativity to manhood. Illicit 
sexual activity by boys, as well as men, signified important developmental issues. Illicit 
sexuality manifested itself for the Bureau both physically and psychologically. For 
example, the Bureau tracked the sexually transmitted diseases the boys carried (syphilis 
was listed as a physical disability). Furthermore, the Bureau determined that some boys 
suffered from “sex problems” while others acted as “sex perverts”. Unfortunately, the 
Bureau did not elaborate on the meaning of these two terms. Given the obsessive worries 
many middle class people had over masturbation, the Bureau may have categorized it as a 
sex problem. Furthermore, because contemporaries often used “pervert” to discuss men 
who dressed as women and solicited sex from other men, the latter most likely signified 
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homosexual behavior. In order for boys to become men, these problems and perversions 
had to be overcome.103  
 For the Bureau, one of the most important problems plaguing boys was 
“wanderlust” or a sense of “adventure” that caused them to prematurely and wrong-
headedly leave their homes.104 Nels Anderson, the famous hobo turned academic, defined 
wanderlust in his seminal 1923 text on the homeless man, The Hobo: The Sociology of 
the Homeless Man. Anderson defined wanderlust as “a longing for new experience. It is 
the yearning to see new places, to feel the thrill of new sensations…” Wanderlust 
particularly affected young boys, who looked upon the traveling tramp not as a problem, 
but as an interesting person whose life was both heroic and enviable.105 The Bureau 
looked upon wanderlust as a significant problem and impediment to casework. A boy 
with wanderlust abnegated the traditional path to manhood in favor of a track the Bureau 
marked as abnormal. For boys afflicted with wanderlust, the Bureau recommended that 
the caseworker actually return with the boy to his home to explain the problem to the 
boy’s parents.106 Thus, from the Bureau’s perspective, the examinations, interviews, and 
investigations that it conducted into each boy’s life revealed significant hurdles to the 
development of a breadwinning man committed to a family of dependents. 
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 The 1930 report also reveals the considerable class distance between the 
caseworker and the boy client. First, out of the one hundred cases examined, only six 
boys were fourteen or fifteen. The importance of this fact is illuminated when one relates 
it to the education levels of the boys in the sample; only twenty nine of the boys had any 
education passed the eighth grade. Many of the Bureau boy clients would have therefore 
been older boys with little education. While this was not entirely unordinary, the 
caseworkers that interviewed and developed plans for these boys had college degrees.107 
The jobs that most of these boys held reflected their level education. The boys examined 
worked in a variety of occupations, thirty seven different occupations in total. However, 
an overwhelming majority, sixty five, the Bureau listed simply as “laborers”. 
Furthermore, at least twenty five of the other occupations could easily be considered 
unskilled, making ninety percent of the boys examined part of the working class. Because 
no job description is appended to explain jobs like “fire-eater” and “cow puncher”, this 
number could be higher .108 Many of the boys also found employment in traditionally 
transient occupations. Although thirty one had recently held a job in St. Louis, only ten 
said that they lived in St. Louis. Nineteen boys came from other places in Missouri (the 
report did not say explicitly where in Missouri) and sixteen came from Illinois, while the 
rest hailed from locations as disparate as New York, California, and “Porto Rico”. 
Examining their overall transiency from another perspective, only nineteen had been in 
the city for one year or more, while thirty five applied to the Bureau for assistance after 
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being in St. Louis for only one day.109 The boys’ jobs would have probably been low 
paying, making it difficult to eventually support a family, while transient work meant 
crucial time away from one’s family.              
 The Bureau’s analysis of its casework with boys up to 1930 suggested to the 
Bureau that a proper program for boys would be needed. In some cases, the Bureau 
achieved measurable success: twenty five boys secured employment, two joined the 
army, and nineteen were reunited with their families. However, the Bureau turned seven 
boys over to other agencies while the status of twenty two cases was “unknown”, 
implying that the boy became estranged from the Bureau. Another twenty two received 
the ambiguous status of “made own plan” which, because the Bureau believed unattached 
boys needed the guidance of a professional caseworker, probably implied something 
negative. Furthermore, because three boys remained with the Bureau still undergoing 
casework treatment at the time of the report’s release, the outcome of their casework 
experience could not yet be judged. A handwritten note at the end of the report reveals 
the Bureau’s conclusions about its work with boys up to that point, “The [treatment] of 
these boys requires careful and sympathetic casework treatment.”110  
 If the Bureau had little difficulty determining a course of action from its analysis, 
it is more problematic for the historian to assess the significance or success of the 
caseworker’s activities.  First, the Bureau did not provide any explanations for the 
seemingly positive outcomes of its casework. The Bureau did not record what types of 
jobs it secured for the boys or how well they paid. In short, would the jobs that the 
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Bureau found for each boy allow that boy to develop into a normal man? Furthermore, 
one should also question the Bureau’s success in reuniting boys with their families. 
Because of problematic family dynamics, many boys left their homes. Could casework 
truly reconcile family differences? Moreover, did the Bureau exercise good judgment in 
deciding whether or not to return a boy to a home in which he might be in danger? For 
the caseworkers at the Bureau, the answer had to be affirmative. 
 Although the results of the 1930 report made clear that unattached boys faced 
myriad problems that prevented them from developing normally, the Bureau did not 
immediately develop a formal plan. In the meantime, the Bureau for Homeless Men still 
treated the boys who found themselves under its care. Although the Bureau began to see 
boys as special problems that deserved their own type of care, from the foregoing section 
it becomes clear that Bureau caseworkers applied the same knowledge and standards to 
the boys who needed their help that they used in providing assistance to older unattached 
men. Thus, the importance of family (as a socializing force), work (so that one might be a 
breadwinner), and adherence to certain sexual norms also found expression in the 
Bureau’s work with boys. The goal of providing assistance to these boys, as it was with 
the men, was to overcome these problems. Between 1930 and the creation of the Boys’ 
Lodge in April 1933, the Bureau would continue to define the contours of a concerted 
program.    
 The Bureau for Homeless Men did not develop a formal casework plan for boys 
in isolation. As with the other aspects of its work, the Bureau participated in a national 
community interested in providing social services to unattached individuals. For example, 
the Bureau frequently discussed tactics with the Central Bureau for Homeless and 
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Transient Men in Cleveland, Ohio. In one exchange in 1931, Walter Hoy, the St. Louis 
Bureau’s first executive secretary and caseworker, mused on what he called “one of our 
most difficult case work problems”, the unattached boy.111 Hoy cited approvingly the 
work being done in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles transient agency began by supplying 
dormitory care only, while outsourcing the casework to other social welfare agencies. 
Eventually, the Los Angeles agency moved all their services in-house with seemingly 
positive results. The Bureau would eventually adopt a similar all inclusive plan for its 
boys’ work program.  
 Hoy and the caseworkers at the Central Bureau in Cleveland also discussed 
appropriate age ranges for a program that served homeless boys. The concern over age 
revolved around the question of the appropriate amount of homosocial interaction among 
boys. Hoy argued for establishing a minimum age of fourteen for agencies for unattached 
men that also sought to help unattached boys. Hoy believed that individuals younger than 
fourteen should be placed in children’s agencies or foster homes which, because they 
provided “as near to a normal home life as possible”, could benefit these boys before they 
became too susceptible to corruption. In this instance, the Bureau connected the 
corruption of boys with its fears of the degradation and de-socialization caused by 
frequent homosocial contact. Hoy elaborated upon this sentiment when he stated that 
boys younger than fourteen should not be cared for with older boys, “especially in groups 
such as are placed in boy’s hotels.”112 Older, more seasoned boys might tempt and corrupt 
younger boys. Hoy also provided a rationale for placing boys older than fourteen in 
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private homes. Because many of the Bureau’s boy clients came from broken homes, Hoy 
argued that a home environment, even if the relationship between parent and child was 
not biological, would be beneficial because it would remove the boy from an all-male 
environment. These discussions that the Bureau had with other casework agencies not 
only reveal a national community interested in the problems of unattached men and boys, 
but also something approaching a consensus on the importance of casework in helping 
them. 
 The Bureau also had to contend with other local relief efforts while formulating 
its boys’ program. Like many private social agencies during the depression, the Bureau 
faced reduced funding levels. As in countless cities across the United Stated, the 
depression severely strained the private welfare organizations in St. Louis. By 1930, the 
predicament became so dire that, in October of that year, the mayor formed the Citizens’ 
Committee on Relief and Employment, an umbrella organization that distributed city 
funds to private relief agencies.113 It was within this context that the Bureau released forty 
case studies to what it called the “Council on Relief.”114 The purpose of this move appears 
to have been to demonstrate the necessity of a program for boys (and the Bureau’s need 
for city funds to create the program). The cases chosen by the Bureau illuminate its nexus 
of concerns surrounding the breadwinner ideal and the potential of a maladjusted boy, 
strained by an economic recession, to eventually attain manhood. These case studies also 
demonstrate that the Bureau conducted significant, probing, historical and psychological 
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investigations into its client’s lives. Most importantly, the Bureau undoubtedly chose 
many of the cases to demonstrate its ability to rehabilitate boys who came from extreme 
depravity. Even the cases that are less shocking or less successful serve to make the same 
point: boys who live outside of the family, boys who face unemployment, needed the 
assistance that could only be provided by properly trained social workers.  
 While the Bureau often placed blame upon the choices made by individual 
homeless men, the caseworkers investigating each boy’s life did not always attribute the 
boy’s maladjustment to his own decisions and actions. In many of the cases examined, 
the social worker told the story of the boy’s life in such a way that placed significant 
blame on his mother and father. These cases reveal the Bureau’s assumptions not only 
about proper boyhood, but also the contours and boundaries of respectable parenthood. 
Two cases illustrate this point well. In the first case, the boy was left fatherless after his 
father passed away. Before he passed away, however, the Bureau remarked that he left 
indelibly damaging marks upon his son’s life. The record stated plainly that, “[Boy] is 
confirmed masturbator. Taught practice by father who had been bootlegger before his 
death. Father cohabited with women in boy’s presence.”115 After the father’s death, the 
mother remarried, but went “romancing with ‘boy friend’ in hideaway.” With his sister 
unable to care for the family, the boy went “bumming” and eventually sought relief from 
the Bureau. After the initial investigations into the boy’s life, the caseworker stated that 
the Bureau paid for the boy to join a club (costing the Bureau $3.00 per week) and that he 
found a job and soon became self-supporting.116 This case, while ostensibly a successful 
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one, nonetheless illustrates the limits of the Bureau’s insistence that families must be 
united for a boy to properly develop.   
 The second boy endured perhaps an even more stormy life than the first. This boy 
had already been a client of the Provident Association, a private family welfare agency in 
the city. However, because the boy found himself estranged from his family, the 
Provident Association passed him on to the Bureau. Like the last boy, this boy’s family 
history proved to be unsavory. The boy’s family appears to have been embroiled in a life 
of crime: his grandfather died in prison; his mother was a “dope fiend”; and his father, a 
“proud” criminal, called his son a fool during the caseworker’s interview with him for 
having been “caught.”117 The Bureau found that the boy was “a sex pervert, woman 
impersonator. Known as a ‘pansy’.” After a physical, the doctor conducting the 
examination recommended that the boy receive a circumcision to cure him of his 
perversion. While it is unclear if the Bureau actually subjected the boy to the 
circumcision, the caseworker did in fact send the boy to an unspecified farm. The Bureau 
believed that rural environments, separated from the temptations offered by city life, 
helped “sex perverts” make adjustments to a normal life.118 On the farm, the boy learned 
to raise his own chickens and, according to the Bureau, he began to show signs of 
improvement. In this case, the Bureau measured success in a surprising way, suggesting 
that is was particularly interested in demonstrating its casework skill to the Council on 
Relief. According to the report, the boy took an interest in physical exercise “for 
                                                 
  
 117 “Case 2”, Cases to Form Basis of Publicity by Council on Relief, 1932, Folder 84, Box 4, 
Papers of the Bureau for Men. 
 118 Case Work with Homeless Men and Boys, 36, Folder 332, Box 13, Papers of the Bureau for 
Men. 
67 
 
‘muscles’”, and wanted to learn interior decorating.119 Furthermore, sending the boy to the 
farm required completely separating him from his family, however noxious it might have 
been.  
 The Bureau did not find success with all of its clients. Although the two previous 
boys came from abject circumstances, the Bureau undoubtedly found success with them 
through no small effort on the part of the boy. When the Bureau met with failure, it did 
not place blame on its shortcomings as a professional social worker agency or with the 
casework methodology generally. Instead, the Bureau often attributed the failure of 
casework to character flaws within the boy. “Case 3” is a striking example. In many 
ways, the background and familial circumstances of this case with the previous two share 
remarkable similarities. The Bureau attributed the “bitterness and hatred of society” 
displayed by Case 3 to the treatment that the boy received from his father. The Bureau 
noted that the boy lived as a petty criminal and, along with his brother, also a client of the 
Bureau, followed “the gangster’s codes and use[d] the lingo.”120 After a psychological 
and physical examination, the doctors found that the boy had gonorrhea and a bed 
wetting problem. To cure the latter, a doctor recommended that the boy be circumcised. 
The record noted that the caseworker made little progress on the case, primarily because 
the boy “was just plain lazy.”121 The caseworker contrasted the lack of progress he made 
with Case 3 with the gains made with his brother.  The record stated about the latter that 
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he differed from his brother “chiefly in that he will work more or less.”122 Perhaps in an 
effort to make up for its inability to help Case 3, the Bureau’s record stated that the 
doctors who examined the boy found the Bureau’s work to be worthwhile, and 
recommended that it continue.123  
 In order to combat the inevitable conclusion that it only helped sexually impure, 
lazy boys, the Bureau also used the case studies submitted to the relief council to 
highlight the worthiness of some of its clients. “Case 37” illustrates the sort of worthy, 
virtuous boy that the Bureau could help with city funds. The caseworker glowingly 
reviewed the boy, stating emphatically that he symbolized “the unconquerable American 
boy.” Although his father and sisters deserted, and his mother died, he nonetheless 
educated himself and by the age of sixteen or eighteen (the caseworker could not 
determine the boy’s age), had found a good trade. “And what’s not to be minimized”, the 
caseworker continued, “he keeps himself morally, sexually clean.” The boy sought out 
relief only because of the economic crisis, and the caseworker argued that the boy would 
undoubtedly become self supporting again soon.124 Unfortunately, the Bureau made few 
of these sorts of glowing overtures to the sturdiness and respectability of its clients. 
 By the end of 1932, the Bureau for Homeless Men no longer formally ignored the 
problems presented by homeless boys in the midst of a depression. The Bureau 
envisioned the problem of the unattached boy in near apocalyptic terms. “The seriousness 
of the problem is obvious. We have a small army of boys scattered from coast to coast 
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who have broken with home and community.” Instead of receiving nourishment and 
security from within the family, unattached boys received their education from criminals 
and “hardened men of the road,” men that would recruit these boys into their dangerous, 
deviant lifestyle. Most problematically for the Bureau, as boys spent more time on the 
road, “the value of home means less.”125 Thus, as the Bureau formulated a partially 
publicly financed program for unattached boys, its primary concerns and motivations 
revolved around the inviolability of the family and the possibility for unattached boys to 
develop properly. 
 The Bureau outlined a formal theory and agenda for a program dedicated to boys’ 
work that contextualized the need for a program within a worsening economic 
depression. “As the period of economic depression continues”, its thinking went, “the 
personal problems of boys and young men are going to be increasingly difficult to handle 
and the ‘case turnover’ will be less rapid.”126 As a result of the depression, boys 
increasingly faced exacerbated mental stress related to unemployment, inducements to 
transiency, and an increase in family conflict likely to result in the dissolution of the 
family. Furthermore, the Bureau surmised that boys who took to the road might face an 
existential crisis if they discarded “old axioms and standards…without any new 
philosophy of life to take the place of the old.”127 While the Bureau often located an 
individual’s maladjustment within himself or his family, it admitted that, with the 
collapse of the economy, it was “no longer just a question of helping a boy…get adjusted 
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to his social environment. We are confronted by a social and economic environment that 
is ‘out of joint’…”128 The Bureau would need to enact drastic measures to ensure that its 
boy clients not lose confidence in their ability to become men.   
 The Bureau did not, however, offer any radical plan to solve the country’s 
problems, or even suggest economic redistribution within the bounds of capitalism. 
Instead, the Bureau turned inward and argued that clients could most effectively be 
readjusted by inspiring leadership from social workers “who are equal to the demands of 
a new day.” The Bureau’s prescriptions for this type of social worker revolved around its 
vision of professional casework. The Bureau emphatically argued that the employees of 
the Boys’ Department, two caseworkers and a supervisor, should be men themselves. 
First, the Bureau argued, male employees could “sense the problem of this group [boys] 
more directly and win their confidence more quickly than a woman.” Moreover, the 
caseworkers themselves needed guidance from a supervisor to whom they could relate. 
“For this to be possible”, the Bureau argued, “it is necessary to have a spirit of 
camaraderie and a frank ‘give and take’ between supervisor and workers that does not 
obtain so easily where a woman is trying to lead a staff otherwise entirely composed of 
men.”129 Although the Bureau disavowed homosocial bonding among homeless men, 
male bonding among caseworkers and between caseworkers and clients became a 
necessary component of its plan to help boys.   
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 The Bureau’s insistence on exclusively employing male caseworkers is 
particularly interesting because its reasoning for this arrangement so oddly harkens back 
to the days when non-professional female visitors argued that they could best serve 
troubled mothers because of their innate female compassion.130 Of course, men often held 
elevated positions or served in management in social work agencies, but the Bureau 
grounded its success in casework with boys by mixing its professional aptitude with 
innate manly sensibilities. 131 In a field dominated by women, the manly sensibilities of its 
caseworkers would set the Bureau apart. Furthermore, the Bureau’s argument for a male 
only staff not only assumed that individual male caseworkers had important gendered 
characteristics, but that an important gendered connection existed between professional 
male caseworkers. While the Bureau viewed the homosocial relationships between 
unattached men as problematic and dangerous, homosocial relationships between 
caseworkers performed a crucial function in their jobs. These male connections allowed 
caseworkers to get along better amongst one another, while also helping them relate to 
the problems faced by their clients. The Bureau’s arguments for a male only workforce 
should not be interpreted as an attempt to undermine women in the profession because of 
a fear that a female dominated profession would undermine its professional legitimacy. 
On the contrary, these arguments instead suggest that the Bureau sought to carve out a 
professional sphere for men that could serve as a companion to the casework performed 
by women.    
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 As the Bureau began to implement its casework program for boys, housing 
emerged as the group’s first concern. The Boys’ Work committee invoked the persistent 
problem of homosocial contact among homeless men and boys and found its present 
housing options undesirable because they would place men and boys in close proximity. 
As Nels Anderson described in The Hobo, homeless men and boys engaged in 
intercourse, sometimes consensual, other times forced.132 In either case, this relationship 
imperiled the boy’s development. The committee’s opposition to the use of the YMCA 
expressed these sentiments: “the housing of boys and men should not be combined as 
proper supervision is impossible in a men’s dormitory.” 133 Similarly, the committee 
worried about mixing boys newly on the road with seasoned boys. The representative 
from the Juvenile Court, “Mr. Taft”, argued that it would be entirely undesirable to house 
non-delinquent homeless boys at his facility because mixing them with the delinquents 
might corrupt the otherwise worthy boys. Eventually, the Bureau agreed to find a 
separate housing facility for boys that would provide full casework services that would be 
supplemented by a recreation program designed by the YMCA.134 
Finding a domicile that would aid in the development of the boy into manhood 
proved to be a difficult task for the Bureau to accomplish. Before the creation of the 
Boys’ Department, the Bureau housed boys in a manner similar to the way it housed its 
older clients. Some stayed in the Municipal Lodging House while the Bureau helped 
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others pay for rooms in various hotels around the city. The caseworkers at the Bureau 
viewed this method as problematic. It did not recreate what the Bureau thought of as the 
“natural surroundings” for a boy. As the Bureau sullenly remarked, “too many boys are 
being sent to rooming houses and flop hotels. It is too early in the lives of most of these 
boy clients for us to accept the flop hotel…as their natural surroundings.”135 The Bureau 
also found problems with foster care. In theory, the Bureau believed that the foster home 
situation seemed ideal. A private home away from the temptations of street life seemed 
congruent with the Bureau’s agenda. After some consideration, the Bureau concluded 
that the relationship between the foster parent (they assumed it only to be a mother) and 
the child was too artificial and that the mother rarely provided assistance for the boy 
beyond room and board. Most significantly, “it is too often found that she [the foster 
mother] does not understand the problem of boys.”136 If it seemed that the boy might 
actually benefit from a foster institution, the Bureau suggested that the potential foster 
mother be thoroughly interviewed to determine her moral qualities. The Bureau also 
stressed that the boy be placed in a home that did not exceed a certain standard of living 
so that if the boy found a job, he would “be able to maintain the same standard” without 
yearning for more.137  
 Ultimately, these facilities lacked central oversight by a male caseworker. Toward 
this end, the Bureau established a separate lodge primarily for transient boys in April 
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1933.138 The Bureau placed any white transient boy who applied to the organization for 
services in its boys’ lodge. The boys’ lodge provided its inhabitants with food, shelter, 
and work. Most importantly, the lodge served as a site of rehabilitation for transient boys. 
Through casework and recreation, the Bureau sought to make an adjustment in its clients 
at the lodge. After a boy applied to the Bureau, a caseworker briefly interviewed him and 
then allowed him to rest for the remaining day. In the following morning a more intensive 
interview would take place. The boys stayed in a spacious room that measured about 30 x 
55 feet. Adjacent to this main sleeping area was a reading a room, shower, and office. On 
the floor above them was a room dedicated to recreational activities.139 The Bureau, like 
many others involved in boys’ work, found in recreation for boys an antidote to many 
problems plaguing urban boys.140 The Bureau also supplied the boys with work at the 
lodge, but the parameters of the work they performed remained undefined. The point of 
this work, recreation, and casework, the Bureau stated, was to ensure that the boys “have 
no time to spare”, presumably to keep them from getting into trouble. The Bureau 
considered its work with these transient boys a success if it returned the boy to his 
home.141 
 The lodge allowed the Bureau to maintain almost complete supervision over its 
boy clients. By housing all its transient boys in one place, it minimized the possibility 
that the boy would be able to sneak away undetected. This supervision had its limitations. 
With minimal funds to establish a boys’ lodge in a separate building, the Bureau opened 
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its lodge on the floor above its cafeteria. This presented certain problems because boys 
and older men would be in close proximity if they ate together. The Bureau sensed the 
problems that could have arisen from this situation and prevented boys from eating with 
the older men below them. In order to feed the boys, the Bureau brought to them separate 
meals three times a day (the older men received only two meals). Another limitation to 
the Bureau’s ability to supervise was its lack of legal authority to hold the boys at the 
lodge. Because of this, many boys simply left the lodge whenever they desired. Most 
boys stayed at the lodge for nine or ten days before moving on, either to their hometown 
or to their next destination as transients. The Bureau estimated that, out of every three 
boys who stayed at the lodge, they successfully returned one of them home. Given these 
statistics, it would be difficult to assert the success of the Bureau’s activities.142  
 While the boys’ home provided important services for the urban homeless, the 
caseworkers at the Bureau believed that the urban environment potentially corrupted 
boys. In order to provide a more wholesome experience, the Bureau opened a work camp 
at the Gray Summit location of the Missouri Botanical Gardens, established in 1934 with 
funding from the Federal Emergence Relief Administration (FERA). The same themes of 
supervision, recreation, and casework pervaded the Bureau’s work camp. The Bureau laid 
out two explicit goals that it sought to achieve through this work camp that reflected its 
overall desire to cultivate a proper manhood within its boy clients. Like the lodge, the 
camp enabled caseworkers to supervise the boys twenty four hours a day for as long as 
the boy stayed at the camp. Caseworkers could then always provide assistance and 
guidance to the boy and prevent improper behavior from occurring. Furthermore, camp 
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life prevented the boys from “spending most of their time loafing around the city streets.” 
Most importantly, camps permitted “man to man” interaction between the caseworker 
and the boy.143 The Bureau also envisioned the camp as a place where it could “teach a 
boy what it meant to put in a full day’s work and where we could also give him three 
square meals a day along with helpful camp life.”144 The Bureau also used the camp to 
provide the boys with education and healthy recreation. To this end, the Bureau brought 
in a local high school teacher to teach classes two evenings a week, and educated the 
boys in subjects pertaining to nature and camp life, and played movies once a week.145 
Not all the goals of the camp should be seen as purely altruistic. The camp also served an 
economic function for the Missouri Botanical Gardens. The Bureau supplied labor for the 
projects of the Botanical Gardens, as it had “no available funds”, but had projects that 
needed to be finished.146 The boys brought in by the Bureau built roads, trails, and cleared 
obstructed lands.147   
 Although the Bureau often found that the camp operated under capacity and 
suffered from labor shortages, this did not stop the agency from ejecting boys from the 
program for engaging in behavior that transgressed the boundaries of proper manhood. 
This would not be the first time that the Bureau removed boys from its programs for not 
following its prescriptions. One survey of the Bureau’s work with boys before 1933 listed 
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a number of reasons why a set of cases was closed. Some of these were positive, such as 
familial reconciliation or gainful employment, while other outcomes were decidedly 
negative. Out of 274 boys, Bureau caseworkers removed five boys from its rolls because 
they went to jail, two were kicked off the rolls because they refused to work, and one 
boy’s case was closed because he was sent through the juvenile system.148 At the 
Botanical Gardens camp, the Bureau seemed to invite the boys to act like delinquents. 
The Bureau allowed all the boys at camp to be free from work from Saturday afternoon 
until Sunday night. While the boys only made fifty cents per week, the Bureau permitted 
the boys to visit neighboring towns on the weekend as long as they returned before 
nightfall. In spite of these lenient rules, the Bureau only discussed dismissing four boys 
for delinquent behavior (the exact behavior was not defined), while six boys were 
counted as A.W.O.L. These numbers are admittedly low, but it is probable that other 
cases went unreported. In any case, the Bureau’s banishment of some boys reinforces the 
fact that it tied the acceptance of its vision of manhood to basic relief.149     
 In some sense, the Bureau’s camp at Gray Summit operated as a work camp for 
boys who did not qualify for work through the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The 
CCC operated at a higher, more respectable level than the Bureau’s camps. As historian 
Margot Canaday argued, government officials and the public alike held a positive view of 
the CCC because helped either respectable boys with families or boys who could easily 
identity a person or persons as dependent upon their labor. Many contrasted the CCC to 
the Federal Transient Program, which aided unattached men whom many found to be 
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deviant and dangerous. 150 The point is perhaps even more relevant when one compares 
the CCC with the Bureau’s camp at the Botanical Gardens because each program aided 
boys. Similar to the Transient Program, which the Bureau actually administered in 
Missouri, the Bureau’s camp at the Botanical Gardens received FERA funding and 
provided relief to unattached boys. 151 While requirements for what could constitute a 
dependent were lax, they existed nonetheless and restricted unattached boys from 
receiving a job through the CCC. Although the CCC did not accept unattached boys, the 
Bureau did accept boys with families on occasion, but they were boys who were not 
eligible for the CCC for reasons beyond family life.152 For example, the Bureau’s camp 
accepted boys under 18, parolees, boys who could not pass the physical examination 
required by the CCC, and “many other miscellaneous groups that would not normally be 
eligible for the CCC.”153 When the federal government cut off aid to FERA in favor of 
programs like the Works Progress Administration (also designed to aid men with 
families) and the CCC, the Bureau’s camp at the Botanical Gardens was forced to 
close.154    
 Although a lack of adequate funding forced the Bureau to close down its 
Botanical Gardens camp, work with unattached boys became a special concern of the 
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Bureau after the end of FERA and its resumption of social work as a private agency.155 As 
with its pre-New Deal era work, and its work during the New Deal, the Bureau continued 
to structure its welfare program for unattached boys around the idea that they should be a 
part of a family and be aspiring breadwinners. In this way, the Bureau reflected what 
Andrew Morris called the “New Alignment”, the informal agreement that developed in 
the midst of the New Deal between public and private welfare agencies. The New 
Alignment held that the private agencies would focus on fewer, more specialized problem 
sectors of the population, while the public programs would create a broader relief net.156   
 The “New Alignment” would, of course, not instantly develop, and caseworkers 
at the Bureau seem to have worried that work with unattached boys would be enveloped 
and administered by family casework agencies. Isaac Gurman, a caseworker at the 
Bureau and the organization’s assistant secretary after 1935, noted that many family 
agencies began to perform this work and wondered whether these groups would 
“subordinate the attention and thought given to him [the unattached boy].” Gurman 
argued that agencies like his had separated from family agencies for good reason; the 
work that agencies like the Bureau performed demonstrated the efficacy of specialized 
work with unattached men and boys. In outlining the Bureau’s new program for boys, 
Gurman stated that the organization would focus on providing efficient, professional 
casework: “We will stress professional service rather than [just] maintenance care…we 
will limit our case load to the extent that we can watch everything we try.” Although the 
removal of federal funding may have temporarily checked the aspirations of the Bureau’s 
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caseworkers, they turned with an increasing emphasis toward boys as a way to reestablish 
and assert their professional aspirations. 
 In order to demonstrate the practicality of its work with boys, the Bureau began 
what it called “a program of apprenticeship training.”157 Through this training program, 
the Bureau endeavored to prevent unattached boys from taking the sort of jobs normally 
available to them – jobs in flop houses and pool halls. The Bureau feared that if 
unattached boys took jobs such as these, “the work of many years may be spoiled by the 
poor environment these jobs offered.”158 Yet the jobs in which the Bureau sought to place 
unattached boys would have made it difficult to easily attain the breadwinning, family 
man ideal. Only in exceptional cases, the Bureau argued, should a boy “be taught a 
skilled trade…the caseworker must be sure of his material [the unattached boy] since an 
additional failure in a life already replete with failures is exceedingly harmful…and may 
be the final straw which will preclude further social and economic progress.” The Bureau 
suggested that the best tactic may be to place boys in jobs where they can be kitchen 
helpers or porters.159 The Bureau’s contacts with employers bear this out. The Bureau 
contacted department stores, cafeterias, and the Missouri Pacific railroad, among 
others.160 In this way, the Bureau’s work program functioned similarly to the mother’s 
pensions. These pensions, designed with the intent to allow mothers to abstain from work 
and dedicate their time to raising children, rarely, if ever, attained their goals. 
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Furthermore, the amount of the pension rarely allowed a comfortable life to be lived. 
Similarly, the assistance and guidance provided by the Bureau to its boy clients was 
insufficient to the task of raising the boys to becoming family men.  
 While in St. Louis, either as residents or transients, many homeless and transient 
boys went to the Bureau when they needed help. Although the Bureau offered them some 
of the help they needed, it did so from the perspective of professional social workers and 
as adult men who saw in their beliefs about manhood its true formulation. In addition to 
supplying boys with relief assistance like food and shelter, the Bureau also sought to 
place the boys on the track to becoming breadwinning, family males. Because these boys 
were separated from their families and often unemployed, the Bureau understood them to 
be boys that, without help, could not become men. Thus, the Bureau tied basic necessities 
of life to the adoption of this standard of manhood. However, the Bureau never 
questioned whether its boy clients actually needed casework, or perhaps something else. 
Sure of their abilities to help homeless boys become family men, the caseworkers at the 
Bureau never really formulated a rationale for why society should provide professional 
assistance to homeless boys. Unfortunately, because the Bureau did not keep the record 
of the names of its boy clients, it is impossible to follow up on their lives in order to 
determine if they ever became breadwinners. Although they counted some cases as 
successes, and others as failures, the actual impact that the Bureau had on its boy client’s 
lives is unknown. Nonetheless, by 1940 the Bureau largely abandoned its work with 
homeless men and boys. But why did the Bureau feel it necessary, after 1935, to redouble 
its efforts on casework with unattached boys? To answer this question, we must turn to 
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the development of the Bureau first as a state funded, and then a federally funded, 
welfare agency.     
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Chapter Three: The Private Origins of a Public Program: The Federal Transient Program 
in Missouri  
 While the Bureau for Homeless Men transformed the way homeless, unattached 
men and boys received relief in St. Louis, the organization itself also underwent changes 
as it received increasing amounts of public funding. The stock market crash of October 
1929 and the ensuing economic collapse strained the abilities of private welfare agencies 
in St. Louis to adequately conduct their casework. Private funds were less available and 
relief loads expanded. In October of 1930, St. Louis Mayor Victor Miller created the 
Citizens’ Committee on Relief and Employment. The Citizens’ Committee served as a 
conduit through which city funds could be administered to a select group of agencies, 
which included the Bureau. The Bureau’s transformation into a publicly funded welfare 
agency reached its peak with the creation of the New Deal’s Federal Transient Program 
in 1933, a relief program designed primarily for unattached men. The Bureau played a 
leading role in its development and administration in Missouri, and its vision of the 
family man continued to structure its work with homeless, unattached men. Myron 
Gwinner, the Bureau’s executive secretary, was appointed the director of Unit F, the new 
public division of the Bureau that served as the St. Louis arm of the Federal Transient 
Program. By being accepted to receive funds from the Citizens Committee and develop 
and administer the Federal Transient Program in Missouri, the Bureau’s success as 
professional social workers seemed assured. This chapter seeks to provide a case study in 
the development of the Federal Transient Program through an examination of the 
program’s operations in Missouri.161  
                                                 
 161 Charlotte Ring Fusz, “Origin and Development of the Saint Louis Relief Administration, 1929-
1937” (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, St. Louis University, 1938), 9-10; By July 1933, city funds financed 
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 While public monies enabled agencies like the Bureau to survive, the stream of 
public funds was finite, and its disbursement placed the agencies receiving those funds 
within a welfare hierarchy that supplied more and better funding to groups that provided 
relief to men with families, as opposed to unattached men. This pattern was evident 
during the Bureau’s time as an agency under the Citizens’ Committee and as the 
administrator for the Federal Transient Program in Missouri. The Bureau’s ideal vision of 
a man happily committed to his family of dependents continued to structure its programs 
with unattached men as a publicly funded agency. This vision marked these men, because 
of their perceived distance from that ideal, as deviant and abnormal. This conceptual 
continuity had important effects upon the Bureau’s development as a public agency. In 
other words, the Bureau’s status as a well funded welfare agency was bound up with the 
unattached men it both stigmatized and assisted. The Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration, the agency that supplied funds for the transient program, was seen as a 
temporary relief measure, and the unpopularity of the Federal Transient Program did not 
bode well for continued funding of the program. With a shift in policy emphasis in the 
federal government from relief to security beginning in 1935, embodied in programs like 
Old Age Security, policymakers found only those men who were already breadwinners to 
be entitled to federal benefits. Because of the obliteration of private funding that resulted 
from economic depression, the federal government’s decision to end the Federal 
Transient Program in 1935 nearly destroyed the Bureau.162       
                                                 
over 90% of the Bureau’s expenditures. Analysis of Monthly Statistics of Citizens’ Committee Agencies in 
St. Louis and St. Louis County, Folder 88, Box 4, Papers of the Bureau for Homeless Men, 1925-1982, 
State Historical Society of Missouri, St. Louis.  
 162 For the WPA in relation to men with dependents, see: Fearon, “Relief for Wanderers”, 256; For 
Old Age Security, see, Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 
1890-1935 (New York: The Free Press, 1994).  
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 The Bureau for Homeless Men’s transition into a public agency began with the 
creation of the Citizens’ Committee on Relief and Employment. The Citizens’ Committee 
did not supply funds to every welfare agency in St. Louis. Instead, the Citizens’ 
Committee only admitted family welfare agencies that provided relief in addition to 
specialized, professional services based upon the particular needs of each client. The 
Citizens’ Committee also provided funds to agencies that worked with unattached 
individuals as long as that agency worked with these men “on a casework basis.” While 
the exigencies of the depression placed great stress upon the abilities of casework 
agencies to actually perform casework, the Citizens’ Committee required that each 
agency had to be in its “structure and practice adaptable to emergency conditions on a 
professional basis.” In laying out these guidelines, the Citizens’ Committee actually 
named the Bureau for Homeless Men as an agency that exemplified the sort of 
professional service for which its funds could be used. Although the Bureau worried 
about its professional prospects when it began in 1925, discussed in Chapter One, its 
admission to the Citizens’ Committee seemingly confirmed its attitude that homeless men 
could be helped with professional casework.163    
 The creation of the Citizens’ Committee serves as a further example of the 
Bureau’s developing relationship with governmental agencies. As the Bureau’s early 
work demonstrated, the city essentially contracted the Bureau, and the caseworkers at the 
Bureau played an important role in transforming municipal services for homeless men. 
Now city funds would flow directly to these private organizations and a new executive 
                                                 
 163 Alma Rattini Vanek, “A History of the St. Louis Provident Association, 1930-1935, During 
Administration of Public Funds and the Establishment of the Public Agency,” (Master’s Thesis, 
Washington University, 1938), 37, Folder 11, Papers of the Family and Children’s Services of Greater St. 
Louis, 1861-1960, State Historical Society of Missouri, St. Louis.   
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board formed to harmonize relief efforts. Aside from serving as a vehicle for funding, the 
Citizens’ Committee also sought to: coordinate the relief efforts of the private relief 
agencies in St. Louis with national and state level welfare work; accelerate the process 
through which city bonds could be utilized for relief; examine all possibilities of 
employment in “the business field”; and finally, “ascertain the exact condition of 
unemployment.” Under the Citizens’ Committee, cooperation on employment and relief 
issues, along with reinforcement from the city’s coffers, and not a large federal program, 
were viewed as the best possible methods to solve the country’s economic problems. 
Indeed, by using the existing network of private relief agencies, the Citizens’ Committee 
hoped to avoid an “undue centralization” of relief efforts.164 The Citizens’ Committee left 
the casework departments and the day to day operations of each private agency 
undisturbed. Furthermore, local relief experts comprised the leadership of the executive 
committee of the Citizens’ Committee.165  
 The formation of the Citizens’ Committee and the fiscal stimulus provided by 
publicly financed relief came at a crucial time for the Bureau for Homeless Men. With 
the onset of the market collapse, the relief rolls of the Bureau significantly expanded. In 
1930, the Bureau assisted 1,760 resident unattached men and 1,176 transient unattached 
men, for a total of 2,936 clients. The numbers of men visiting the Bureau grew drastically 
in the following years. In 1931 the Bureau served 9,207 men (including 1,826 non-
resident transients) and by 1933, the year federal government instituted the FERA and the 
                                                 
 164 Fusz, “Origin and Development,” 12.   
 165 Aside from Mayor Miller and the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, the presidents of the 
Catholic Charities, the Jewish Federation, the Community Fund and Community Council, the Lutheran 
Charities Association, and the “chairmen of other private relief giving agencies” formed the main executive 
body. Fusz, “Origin and Development,” 10-11.   
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transient program, the Bureau served 28,474 men, 9,012 of which were transients. This 
over eight hundred percent increase in the relief population placed considerable strain 
upon the abilities of the private relief network in St. Louis to effectively carry out the 
work it had done before 1929.166 
 The Bureau’s relief rolls did not merely expand in overall aggregate. The racial 
makeup of its clientele transformed during the early years of the depression as well. 
Specifically, the number of unattached black men made up an increasingly large portion 
of the Bureau’s overall relief load. Between 1925 and 1929, black men made up only 
between four percent and sixteen percent of the overall total, although for most months, 
black men made up fewer than ten percent of the total case load. By 1930, the average 
number of unattached black men in the Bureau was just under thirteen percent, and by 
1931 the average was forty four percent. During 1932 and 1933, the monthly amount was 
sometimes as high as seventy seven percent of the overall total.167 The standard historical 
interpretation of transients suggests that their racial makeup skewed almost entirely 
white. Historian Todd Depastino argued for this point by demonstrating that white 
transients viewed the road as a domain of white privilege. As the statistics of the Bureau 
suggest, while white transient men believed that the road belonged to them alone and 
                                                 
 166 The Bureau attributed some of the increase in its caseload to the fact that in April of 1933, they 
assumed control of the city’s Municipal Lodging House, which mostly provided physical, overnight relief 
to single men. Adequate records for the Municipal Lodging House are difficult to find, but one report 
created by the Bureau in 1929 stated that 6,260 men were registered for 1928, although a year before 7,499 
men registered. Thus, even accounting for the assumption of responsibility for the Municipal Lodging 
House, the Bureau’s non-lodging house clientele exploded during the first years of the depression. See, 
Annual Report, 1934, 21, Folder 5, Box 1, Papers of the Bureau for Men; The Effect of the Three Night 
Rule, Folder 88, Box 4, Papers of the Bureau for Men.    
 167 “Statistical Analysis of Non-Family Men of Relief” (St. Louis: Bureau for Men, 1937), 27-29.    
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used this attitude to threaten black men, the statistics of the Bureau suggest that black 
transient may have been more prevalent than previously considered. 168  
 While the road may have been contested, the Bureau also worked to keep its 
caseload predominately white. The Bureau’s reaction to the increase in the number of 
black clients beginning in 1931 suggests that, at a time when its professional prospects 
appeared strongest, the presence of black men threatened the gains the organization 
made. As discussed in the first chapter, the Bureau opened an office dedicated purely to 
casework in 1931 in order to help men that it believed stood the best chance of making 
adjustments to family life. The Bureau’s casework office at the Municipal Lodging 
House, the mass care shelter operated by the city, continued to operate, but the Bureau 
funneled less desirable men to that location. The Bureau understood unattached black 
men as better suited to the lodging house. For example, when discussing the amount of 
men visiting the Bureau’s casework office, one Bureau committee member, Sydney 
Maestre,  raised the problem posed by the “large increase in the number of colored men” 
visiting the Bureau. Maestre proposed that the Bureau send these men to the lodging 
house. The Bureau did have much success in drastically reducing the amount of black 
men in its case load; by 1934 and 1935, the numbers decreased from a high of seventy 
seven percent, but still hovered around thirty five to forty percent. In spite of its failure to 
reduce the number of black men, the Bureau revealed that its vision of manhood was a 
vision open only to whites.169       
                                                 
 168 Depastino, Citizen Hobo, xx.   
 169 “Statistical Analysis of Non-Family Men of Relief,” 27-29. Another piece of evidence from the 
Bureau’s files suggest that a startling number of black men, and perhaps women and children, took to the 
road to seek help in St. Louis, both from within Missouri and from other states. In October of 1931, a large 
number of African-Americans, around 2,000, travelled north from southern Missouri and Northern 
Arkansas to seek relief. Relief agencies, alarmed by the large increase in the black relief population, 
immediately began to work with cotton growers in Pemiscott County in southeast Missouri to try to 
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 In response to the rapid expansion in the case load, the Bureau and the Citizens’ 
Committee jointly developed a work program between 1932 and 1933. The programs 
highlight the way the Bureau’s ideal vision of manhood shaped the way it constructed its 
work program. The Bureau and the Citizens’ Committee designed each program to deal 
with a heavier relief load, yet the programs functioned much differently. One of the 
primary distinctions between the work programs, aside from the quality of the work 
given, was that resident men with families were provided non-stigmatizing work as relief, 
that is to say, a job that paid cash, while non-family men were expected to work off the 
relief (clothing, shelter, and food) that the Bureau provided them. The Citizens’ 
Committee privileged the work program for family men by providing it with ample city 
funds. In contrast, the Bureau had to finance its work program with its privately raised 
funds. The “work-test” for unattached men and the separate funding sources had the 
effect of establishing two distinct relief tracks for men.170  
 The Bureau’s perception of unattached men as abnormal seemingly legitimized 
these distinctions in the work programs. As discussed in the first chapter, the Bureau 
never really developed a functioning work program. In fact, the Bureau found the harsh 
work requirements demanded by the Charity Organization Society to be 
counterproductive. Professional casework with the goal of helping an unattached man 
realize his role as family provider appeared to the Bureau to be the best method for 
dealing with this group. It is perhaps surprising that, as we shall soon see, the Bureau so 
enthusiastically adopted the new work program. To be sure, enacting a work program 
                                                 
reabsorb the travelers. See Meeting Minutes of CCRE Technical Committee, 16 October 1931, Folder 113, 
Box 5, Papers of the Bureau for Men; Meeting Minutes of CCRE Technical Committee, 22 October 1931, 
Folder 113, Box 5, Papers of the Bureau for Men         
 170 Budget Analysis, 1929-1933, Folder 88, Box 4, Papers of the Bureau for Men. 
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may have been a requirement to receive city funds. Nonetheless, the Bureau’s 
understanding of unattached men as deviant and “less than” a man with a family, a view 
point that it actively promoted, undergirded the organization’s less privileged status in the 
Citizens’ Committee work program hierarchy.     
 The program created by the Citizens’ Committee stressed that its clients should be 
chosen based “on the family need.”171 The program made space for women, but, as other 
historians have demonstrated, work programs often filled open slots with men with 
families before giving those same positions to women. In order to qualify, the applicant 
had to have at least “three dependents all living in the same household” and must be a 
“bona fide citizens of St. Louis”, therefore barring even intrastate transients with families 
from applying. For their efforts, each worker would be compensated according to the 
prevailing wage for that particular job, but they could make no more than fifty dollars per 
month.172 The Citizens’ Committee hoped to attract “a certain amount of skilled labor, 
technicians and members of the white collar group” with its work program.173 As an 
example of the work provided, the Citizens’ Committee employed seven hundred men on 
street and sewer work throughout 1933. To be sure, it is unclear if this was skilled labor 
or merely cleaning work. What is important, however, is that the Citizens’ Committee 
provided this work to breadwinning family men under the assumption that, besides 
unemployment, they had nothing wrong with them.174    
                                                 
 171 Work Relief program of the Citizens Committee on Relief and Employment, Folder 114, Box 
4, Papers of the Bureau for Men.   
 172 Nancy Rose, Put to Work: the WPA and Public Employment in the Great Depression (New 
York: Monthly Review Press); Lois Scharf, To Work and to Wed: Female Employment, Feminism, and the 
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 173 Work Relief program of the Citizens Committee on Relief and Employment, Folder 114, Box 
4, Papers of the Bureau for Men.   
 174 Meeting Minutes of the CCRE Technical Committee, 6 April 1933, Folder 114, Box 5, Papers 
of the Bureau for Men.   
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 While the Citizens’ Committee provided its workers with a weekly pay check, the 
men in the Bureau’s program had to “work out their entire relief,” meaning that relief was 
provided as payment for work.175 This policy reflected the assumption of deviance on the 
part of non-family men. Unlike the men with families, men in the Bureau’s work program 
also had to undergo casework treatment. The stated aims of the Bureau’s work program, 
which it felt it had fulfilled, were twofold. First, the Bureau desired “to get rid of the men 
receiving help who were too lazy and shiftless to work or who did not need it badly 
enough to work for it…” Second, the Bureau hoped to improve the morale of the “better 
class” by helping them to feel that they had worked for their relief and had not merely 
taken a hand out. The Bureau placed its clients into two different work relief categories 
depending upon the type of services the client needed. The Bureau assigned men needing 
only temporary relief, often clothing, to the work department and gave them certain tasks 
around the Bureau’s offices at the rate of forty cents per hour. When the man had worked 
off the amount of relief provided to him, he would be given the relief he needed. The 
Bureau’s caseworkers congratulated themselves on the fact that, after the first month, 
they reduced the rate at which men refused work for their relief from twenty to seven 
percent. To the Bureau, this appeared as if its casework methods were creating positive, 
manlier, changes in its client’s character.176  
 The Bureau designed a second grouping for men who needed more than simply a 
set of clothing or who visited the Bureau more than once during a month. At the end of 
each month, every man in this second group would be given a bill that totaled the amount 
of relief expended upon them along with a letter telling them when and where to report 
                                                 
 175 Fusz, “Origins and Development.” 28.  
 176 Annual Report of the Bureau for Men, Folder 16, Box 1, Papers of the Bureau for Men. 
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for work. Men employed in this group were given a three dollar credit toward their relief 
for each full day worked along with twenty-five cents for spending money.177 Most of the 
men appear to have been placed at a farm organized by the Bureau in St. Louis County 
that actually grew all the vegetables used in the Bureau’s cafeteria. The Bureau 
transported the men each day by truck to the seventy-acre farm. The men also constructed 
a local community garden, built a playground for a settlement house, remodeled the 
Chestnut Lodge (a lodging house operated by the Bureau), and worked on a city plaza 
until the Civil Works Administration took over operations. At that point, Bureau clients 
could no longer work on the plaza because the Civil Works Administration only provided 
work to men with families.178  
 Thus, as the welfare agencies of St. Louis reacted to the depression, they 
categorized and relieved men differently according to their relationship to the ideal of a 
breadwinning family man. Men working on the projects of the Citizens’ Committee, or 
the Civil Works Administration, received priority on jobs and better pay. Men on the 
Bureau’s jobs program had to undergo a work test and only received relief, not cash, for 
the work they performed. This division was rooted in the perception of unattached men as 
deviant and less worthy than a man with a family, a perception that the Bureau cultivated 
since its inception in 1925. This gendered distinction continued to manifest itself during 
the Bureau’s time as a publicly funded welfare agency.  
                                                 
 177 Again, because of sketchy statistical reporting, it is difficult to determine how much relief 
would be equal to work for one day at a rate of three dollars. For 1933, the average relief cost per month 
was between four and five dollars, but because that number isn’t broken down further, it is hard to say if 
four dollars of relief would have been expended upon a man over the course of one day, one week, or one 
month. “Statistical Analysis of Non-Family Men on Relief,” 25.   
 178 Annual Report of the Bureau for Men, Folder 16, Box 1, Papers of the Bureau for Men; Rose, 
Put to Work, 47.   
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 Although the injection of city funds through the Citizens’ Committee no doubt 
helped to shore up the private relief agencies in St. Louis, the Depression continued to 
worsen throughout the early 1930s and the agencies quickly spent the city funds made 
available. In addition to more men and women simply seeking relief, the work program 
of the Citizens’ Committee burdened the city’s funds by allowing men with families to 
work five and a half days instead of the originally prescribed four. By January 1932, the 
welfare agencies in St. Louis nearly depleted the funds made available by the city, 
threatening relief for an estimated 60,000 people. In June of 1932, the Board of Alderman 
for St. Louis threatened the Citizens’ Committee that it would withhold city funds unless 
it ceased to provide relief for nonresidents of St. Louis, a move that members of the 
Citizens’ Committee vehemently opposed. This move by the Alderman would have 
especially effected the Bureau because non-residents composed a significant portion of 
its caseload. By July 1932, an overstretched budget necessitated that between 8,000 and 
10,000 people be dropped from the relief rolls, a move that stunned those individuals who 
had been receiving that relief. 179  
 The reaction of unattached men to these cuts is perhaps the only example of 
organized resistance against the Bureau, and it suggests that the unattached men were not 
merely empty receptacles for the knowledge held by the caseworkers at the Bureau. 
According to the Citizens’ Committee, of all those who had been dropped from the relief 
rolls, single men expressed the most resentment over the cuts. In response to the cuts, 
these men requested begging permits more frequently. Furthermore, rumors of the cuts 
                                                 
 179 Meeting Minutes of the CCRE Technical Committee, 6 April 1933, Folder 114, Box 5, Papers 
of the Bureau for Men; To Victor Miller from Tom K. Smith, 29 January 1932, Folder 114, Box 5, Papers 
of the Bureau for Men; Meeting Minutes of the CCRE Technical Committee, 22 June 1932, Folder 114, 
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appear to have sparked organized agitation on the part of the men under the care of the 
Bureau. By the end of 1932, both the St. Louis Post Dispatch and the St. Louis Globe 
Democrat reported on a number of organized disturbances that occurred at the Bureau’s 
cafeteria.180 The Bureau’s clients also organized against the Bureau’s work program. A 
watercolor flyer distributed by the “Single Men’s Council” stated “Organize – Men 
Refuse to Work Unless You Get Decent Wages.” Another flyer advertised a meeting that 
would discuss “the forced labor plan that [the] Bureau [for] Homeless Men will try on 
us[.] [C]ome on men don[’]t wait till they make slav[e]s out of you.”181 What these 
meetings, flyers, and protests suggest is that single men during this period not only 
organized as men, but that they had some gendered conception of themselves as single 
men.        
 By dispersing federal funds, the creation of the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) in May 1933 ultimately allowed the agencies of the Citizens’ 
Committee to continue operating and weather the stormy protests. However, like with the 
arrival of the Citizens’ Committee, the actual structure of the Bureau remained relatively 
unchanged. The primary stipulation that came with the use of FERA funds that would 
have affected the Bureau concerned the Bureau’s status as a nominally private agency. 
The FERA required that any agency that sought to use FERA funds had to be a public 
agency. While the Citizens’ Committee, which included Myron Gwinner, lodged a formal 
complaint against the “rules and regulations” issued by FERA, the particular problems 
                                                 
 180 Meeting Minutes of the CCRE Technical Committee, 7 July 1932, Folder 114, Box 5, Papers of 
the Bureau for Men; Call for Meeting of the Single Men of Community Kitchen and Municipal Lodging 
House, 25 January 1932, Volume 2, Papers of the Bureau for Men; “15 Arrested in Free Food 
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the committee had remain unknown and, in any case, compliance with the rules came 
swiftly, probably because becoming a public agency did not require a radical 
reorganization of any of the agencies. In the Bureau’s annual report for 1933, Gwinner 
wrote that the Citizens’ Committee took over almost the entire caseload of the Bureau, 
but that this changed very little: although the Bureau was now known as “Unit F,” the 
Bureau’s office remained in the same location and was staffed by the same social workers 
and clerical workers. Leadership at Unit F did not change either, as Gwinner now 
oversaw the activities of the new public unit. On September 1, 1933, the Bureau 
reorganized to meet the demands of the FERA.182  
 The arrival of FERA funds for the Bureau further reinforces the notion that the 
New Deal often operated through state and local governments when possible. Although 
FERA was nominally federal, policymakers in Washington relied upon individuals in the 
private sector, and in city and state government to develop and administer programs and 
funds. This held true for the Federal Transient Program, which the federal government 
created under FERA. Wallace Crossley, the director of the Missouri Relief and 
Reconstruction Commission, the state organization that distributed federal funds183, stated 
that the Missouri state conference on the transient program had convened to create a state 
program “pursuant to instructions from the Federal Relief Administration.” Along with 
Myron Gwinner, a panoply of religious organizations, private welfare groups, 
representatives from city relief boards, and state administrators interested in the problem 
                                                 
 182 To CCRE Agencies from E.G. Steger, 18 August 1933, Folder 111, Box 5, Papers of the 
Bureau for Men; Meeting Minutes of the CCRE Technical Committee, 27 July 1933, Folder 114, Box 5, 
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of unattached men comprised the group that would develop the transient program in 
Missouri. However, the FERA and its subsidiary programs operated through the states 
and would have had to rely upon the experience or expertise of people and organizations 
in the states. The Federal Transient Program, then, at least in Missouri, should not be 
seen as a creature entirely of the federal government, or as an entirely new program, as it 
was constructed by individuals and groups with at least some experience working with 
this particular group of men.184  
 The Federal Transient Program, as it developed in Missouri, expressed significant 
conceptual and methodological continuity with the Bureau’s work as a private agency. 
The most obvious manifestation of the Bureau’s influence on the Federal Transient 
Program in Missouri is revealed in the fact that, at the first conference on the formation 
of a state transient program, those present nominated Myron Gwinner, the Bureau’s 
executive secretary, to chair the committee responsible for the development of the 
program. Gwinner had a pervasive influence upon the plan, most evident in the central 
importance of casework to the program, along with the assumption that non-family men 
deviated from the male breadwinner ideal. As the committee’s plan stated, “any carefully 
planned program” should have as its goal the prevention of transiency. Critical to this 
task was casework, which “should be made available to each individual and any plan 
developed [for the individual] should be based on casework.” 185  One observer wrote that 
the purpose of casework in the transient program was “to provide the possibility of 
treatment of personal and psychological problems which were often fundamental to 
                                                 
 184 State Conference on Transients, 13 September 1933, Folder 313, Box 13, Papers of the Bureau 
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 185 A Tentative Program for the Care of Non-Residents of the State of Missouri, 19 September 
1933, Folder 313, Box 13, Papers of the Bureau for Men.  
97 
 
social or economic rehabilitation of the transients.”186 The casework plan served as a sort 
of revolving door for the Federal Transient Program. Similar to the Bureau’s operation as 
a private agency, the willingness to be interviewed by a social worker permitted the man 
entrance into the Bureau’s program. If the man refused “to cooperate in any available 
plan of stabilization” he would be dismissed from it.187 The importance of casework to the 
program was even initially endorse by Harry Hopkins, administrator of FERA, who 
echoed many of Gwinner’s ideas when he stated that the Federal Transient Program 
would provide “a new chance in life” for transients.188   
 While the Federal Transient Program relied upon the foundations established by 
the Bureau, the entrance of the federal government into relief for unattached men did 
disrupt certain elements of the relief process. For example, the transient program made 
some significant alterations in the geography of relief distribution. The program 
established reference centers, treatment centers, and, by the end of 1933, a network of 
work camps throughout the state. No longer would men receive relief solely from urban 
casework offices like that of the Bureau, although city centers would form a critical piece 
of the relief network. Many men’s first experience with the transient program would be at 
the reference centers, which were established in various mostly rural localities throughout 
the state. The reference centers were designed to prevent men from traveling on their own 
plans. Instead, these centers sought to funnel men in to the transient program’s network. 
                                                 
 186 Ellery Reed, Federal Transient Program, 45; John McKinsey also stressed the importance of 
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The reference center provided immediate, physical relief to the man and arranged for his 
transportation to a treatment center, where he would undergo casework. If the man’s non-
residency was established, he would perform some type of work to pay for his 
transportation to a treatment center. The committee designing the transient program in 
Missouri established three treatment centers in the state; in St. Louis, Kansas City, and St. 
Joseph.189  
 The treatment centers embodied the Bureau’s dedication to the casework method. 
Like the reference centers, the treatment centers also provided physical relief to 
unattached men, but the main priority was to provide casework with the goal of the 
“rehabilitation of these men stabilized in the local community.”190 In St. Louis, the offices 
of the Bureau for Homeless Men, under the direction of Myron Gwinner, served as the 
transient treatment center. Although the relief network greatly expanded under the 
Federal Transient Program, the core casework principles that the Bureau applied in its 
pre-1933 activities remained central in its work with transients at the treatment centers. 
The purpose of the caseworker at the Bureau’s transient treatment center was to divine 
the man’s “various personal characteristics, his residence status, his family connections, 
the reason he was traveling, and any specific problem which was contributing to his 
unadjustment [sic].” Once the caseworker made the “intelligent diagnosis of the 
unadjustment,” the caseworker then engaged in “social therapy in order to effect a speedy 
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readjustment.” By performing this crucial function, the shelter “soon came to be an 
integral part of the transient bureau.”191 
 Prior to 1933, the Bureau cared for transient and resident men in the same offices, 
but the transient program ostensibly altered the organizational structure that supported the 
care and relief of unattached men. Compliance with FERA regulations transformed most 
of the Bureau into a public agency known as Unit F, and operations with transient 
unattached men were separated from those with the resident unattached. In practice, 
however, little seems to have changed. Bureau caseworkers, along with their executive 
secretary, oversaw the care of both types of men. The federal portion of the program that 
handled interstate transients established its offices in the Bureau’s building and “worked 
very closely” with them.192 To be sure, the Bureau now often referred transient men to the 
newly created work camps, but it treated resident men as it did prior to 1933. Indeed, the 
Bureau maintained its own privately funded casework department that handled intensive 
resident cases. While the intensive cases went to the private department, other resident 
men received either outdoor relief or institutional care in one of the Bureau’s shelters. In 
the cases of those men receiving outdoor relief, the Bureau continued to visit their homes 
to determine if conditions were satisfactory, and interviews were required for both 
outdoor and institutional relief.193 In spite of the increased workload the Bureau received, 
the organization nonetheless continued to work with unattached men on an individualized 
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basis, believing this to be the best way to instill the family man ideal in the unattached 
man.   
 Transformations in the financial setup of the Bureau’s work reflected and 
accompanied those taking place within the organizational structure. As a private agency, 
the Bureau for Homeless Men used one funding pool to pay for the care of both transient 
and resident unattached men. Even under the Citizens’ Committee on Relief and 
Employment, the Bureau seems to have made little practical distinction between transient 
and resident men. With the advent of the Federal Transient Program, however, transient 
men would no longer be supported by state or local funds; instead, federal funds would 
be used to provide for their care. Although this decision would be reversed by 1935, for a 
short period of time federal funds were used to support transient, single men. While the 
transient program cared for some intrastate transient Missourians, residents of Missouri 
continued to be mostly supported by state and local funds. One should not exaggerate the 
significance of these facts; while transients were the only individuals in the Bureau’s 
network to be fully provided for by federal funds, federal funds were also used to prop up 
the functions of the Bureau that provided care to resident unattached men. Simply stated, 
without federal funds, local and state homeless men would not have received relief. 
Despite the confusing and overlapping nature of the transformations in the Bureau’s 
organization and funding sources, certain programmatic distinctions remained, like the 
intrastate transient program, which can be attributed entirely to the Bureau, while the 
construction and camp programs reflect a joint venture between the FTP and the 
Bureau.194  
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 The Bureau designed its intrastate transient program in the spring of 1934 in order 
to not only achieve its usual goal of reuniting men with their families through casework, 
but also to seal off eastward movement out of St. Louis in an attempt to reduce interstate 
transiency. St. Louis served as an important destination for men seeking work as it was 
connected by rail to points east. Many of the intrastate transients departed east from 
Jackson County, the state’s second largest industrial section. A second contingent 
travelled from southeast Missouri, which had recently suffered agricultural losses and 
which the Bureau termed as Missouri’s “blighted cotton counties.” Much of the Bureau’s 
black clientele derived from these devastated agricultural communities.195 The Bureau 
used casework interviews to determine why these men left their homes. Most men stated 
that they left home to look for work, a reason that should have been believable given the 
economic depression. However, the Bureau surmised that, “there is generally some other 
contributing factor which furnishes the final incentive for leaving. Consequently we 
always try to go behind the reason given and find the real one.”196 For the Bureau, then, 
outward, explicit statements of economic distress merely concealed deeper individual 
maladjustments that prevented men from being content in their families.   
 The Bureau touted the overall success of its intrastate transient program, 
especially as it compared to similar efforts made by the federal government. The Bureau 
argued that an intrastate transient program needed to be established because it felt the 
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federal government was doing a poor job in preventing intrastate transiency.197 Without 
providing the basis for it, the Bureau calculated that the federal government only returned 
one percent of the transients it helped, both intrastate and interstate.198 In contrast, the 
Bureau boasted that, “we were actually preventing the break-up of families and perhaps 
re-uniting families…”199 During the one year that the Bureau ran the program, sixty four 
percent of the counties from which the transients left authorized their return, although 
only twenty seven percent actually returned home as a direct result of the Bureau’s 
casework interventions.200 As the program progressed, however, the caseworker’s success 
rate declined, which the Bureau attributed to a change in its clientele. At the beginning of 
the program, the Bureau argued, the men it helped had been on the road for a shorter 
period of time and were therefore more likely to return home. In the program’s later 
period, the opposite was true, and the men were consequently less likely to return home. 
Published in 1938, the Bureau’s report on its intrastate program revealed a tension 
between it and the federal government two that would develop between 1933 and 1935.201  
 Race played a considerable role in the Bureau’s success in returning its clients 
home. For example, eighty percent of the white boys and sixty five percent of the adult 
white men in the intrastate program received authorization to return home, while only 
forty seven percent of the adult black men, over eighty percent of whom were single, 
were permitted to return home.202 This suggests that the various relief agencies the Bureau 
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contacted were happy to receive their young white boys back, but they missed their single 
black men less. In light of this discrimination, the Bureau’s casework success rate with 
black men was considerably lower than the success rate for whites. The success rate for 
white men and boys was thirty seven percent, while the success rate for black men and 
boys was only twenty two percent.203 While the Bureau’s racial policies have been 
rightfully questioned here, its low casework success rate, in this instance, should mostly 
be attributed to the apparent racism on the part of smaller communities in Missouri.   
 While the Bureau’s records for its intrastate program often express disapproval of 
the federal government, certain programs, like the construction work projects, relied upon 
a greater degree of cooperation not only between the state and federal portions of the 
transient program, but also a wider array of state agencies. The construction work 
program was predicated “on the fact that all normal men everywhere prefer to work for a 
living.”204 Early on in the history of the FTP in Missouri, for example, members of the 
State Highway Commission and the highway engineers for St. Louis and Jackson 
Counties, lobbied the transient program’s advisory committee to advance road 
construction projects through the transient program. The construction interests proposed 
to “colonize transients receiving federal aid in localities where landscaping work may be 
supplied by the highway commission.” The program, deemed “highway beautification as 
a work project”, would begin in St. Louis and Jackson County and extend to other areas 
in the state if successful.205 Transient men from a St. Louis County camp were also used 
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in order to beautify an underprivileged boys’ camp established by the YMCA in Eureka, 
south of St. Louis. The construction programs reveal the extent to which the Federal 
Transient Program required the cooperation of local, state, and private agencies. This 
cooperation would also be evident in the transient program’s work camps.206  
 While the transient program’s work camps are perhaps its most memorable 
aspect, or at least the part most often written about by historians, the therapeutic 
dimension of the program has been ignored. Transient administrators envisioned the 
camps as companions to the therapeutic program found in the urban treatment centers. 
Program administrators hoped that the construction of the camps, performed almost 
entirely by the transients, would help men feel “they were building themselves a 
home.”207 The camps established in Missouri and throughout the nation served 
simultaneously as homes, sites of work, and centers of rehabilitation for transient men. 
Although the camps undoubtedly acted as homes, a crucial aspect of the home was 
missing, and this emptiness revealed a conceptual hole in the fabric of the plan: the 
camps had no “family” or “dependents” with which the man could interact and realize his 
manhood. As with the lodging houses discussed in the first chapter, the camps seemed to 
encourage the lifestyle of the homeless man. Nonetheless, by February 1934, Missouri 
was scheduled to have eight transient camps constructed in the state in St. Louis, Kansas 
City, Joplin, Springfield, and St. Joseph.208  
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 The transient camps, although seeking to rehabilitate and relieve non-family men, 
simultaneously reinforced the distinctions between welfare programs designed for 
breadwinners and non-breadwinners. The first work program the Bureau participated in 
with the Citizens’ Committee, described above, provided family men with work that 
remunerated in cash, not relief, and also gave more opportunities for work as well. For 
the most part, the state constructed camps where the caseloads of transient men existed 
and they served no practical economic value. Instead, the camps served a strictly 
rehabilitative. Although program administrators discussed building camps along 
roadways for beautification projects, this was more of an exception than a rule. The 
reason the transient camps only served a rehabilitative and non-economic function was to 
avoid competition with the “regular” work relief projects like the Civil Works 
Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. These projects provided economic 
stimulus to men with families and dependents. A directive released by the Missouri State 
Social Security Commission succinctly and directly summarized this policy perspective: 
“In general, it is intended that Transient projects should not compete with relief work 
projects or projects undertaken by the C.C.C. Camps.” 209 That is to say, the camps were 
constructed so as to prevent transient men from taking away valuable work from 
programs designed for men and boys with families.  
 The everyday life and work at the transient camps also reflected the same 
gendered divisions found between the work programs designed by the Citizens’ 
Committee and the Bureau in the early 1930s. Again, what constituted this dissimilar 
treatment between men was the notion held by social workers that non-family men were 
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abnormal, untrustworthy, and in need of rehabilitative care. As with the Bureau’s work 
program, men mostly received direct relief at camps as an exchange for their labor. This 
was conceived both as a work test, to determine if men would work for their relief, and to 
help effect a personal readjustment in the man.210 Also like the Bureau’s earlier work 
program, which used men to do maintenance work at its offices and grow food at a farm 
for use in the cafeteria, the work provided to the transients was largely designed to make 
the camps self sustaining.211 While men apparently took great interest in the initial 
construction of the camps, according to an early commentator on the program, 
maintenance did not promote a similar sense of “personal achievement and self 
interest.”212 Some cash allowances were distributed, however, and the amount was 
determined by whether the man provided skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled labor. By 
providing these allowances, administrators hoped to quell street begging and integrate the 
man economically, at least in a small way, with the surrounding community and 
acclimatize him to a more normal existence.213 Yet the pay was much lower than that 
provided to men in the “regular” programs. Eventually, some transient men in the camps 
refused to do skilled work when the WPA wage scale was widely released, which showed 
that unskilled WPA workers received a higher pay rate than the skilled laborers at 
transient camps.214  
 Although the structure of New Deal relief placed unmarried men in a lower 
category of assistance, the men at camp routinely flouted the rules and gender norms of 
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camp life. This becomes obvious when one examines the turnover rate at Missouri 
camps, a rate that was astonishingly high. Most men did not stick around at the camps 
long enough to provide labor of any sort, and it is surprising that many of the camps were 
even constructed. Throughout the two year existence of the Federal Transient Program in 
Missouri, seventy percent of the men placed in camps stayed in camp less than one 
week.215 Furthermore, this high turnover rate forced many caseworkers to close their 
cases prematurely: ninety-four percent of the social worker’s cases were closed because 
men “left of their own accord.” As an interesting point of comparison, social workers 
closed three percent of their cases because their clients secured employment.216 Part of the 
men’s transiency can be explained by a liberal relief policy at the camps; men arriving at 
a camp were given relief for three days without being required to work.217 Perhaps more 
important were camp conditions. First, if many men left their homes in search of work, 
they would have found that the transient camps were not good places to find it, as the 
statistic above demonstrates. In response to a questionnaire concerning camp “morale” 
delivered to all transient directors from Harry Hopkins, Gwinner stated that, “Prospects 
of any appreciable number of our men securing employment in the next six months is 
very poor.” Gwinner further stated that the physical condition of the men was low 
“principally due to [a] long period of time on limited rations…”218 One food report 
showed that the camp was primarily being fed on seven-hundred pounds of potatoes.219 
Finally, Gwinner offered a bleak assessment “from the standpoint of morale” for 
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unattached men. The group, he said, can be divided in two, “those who accept their 
present condition which after all is not much worse…than that to which they were 
accustomed; and those who are rather confused, discouraged, and see no hope for the 
future.”220 If camp offered little personal hope, why stay?  
 The intransigent transiency of unattached men was not the only thing causing 
problems at the camps. The incompetency of some of the transient bureau staff made 
operation of the camps difficult. One camp director in particular, Rufus Garland of the 
camp in Ballwin, a suburb west of St. Louis, created significant problems for the transient 
program. Issues with Garland began early in 1934, when Garland seems to have made 
purchases and decisions for the camp without first consulting Gwinner. Furthermore, 
when Richard Gebhardt, assistant director of the Missouri transient operation, visited 
Garland’s camp in February, Gebhardt noted the obvious drunkenness of Garland. This, 
Gebhardt felt, set a bad example for the unattached men under Garland’s care.221 Two 
weeks later, Garland, who had been “drinking steadily for [the] last week”, began a fight 
with another social worker and a feeling of restlessness swept over the camp.222 Garland 
resigned in August, and a story in the Sedalia Herald published his side of the story. 
According to Garland, he resigned because of the immense graft and corruption that 
occurred within the ranks of the program. Garland stated that all administrators were 
given “purchase books” that provided them free reign to buy what they like. Garland 
charged one camp director, D.D. England, with using these books to purchase golf clubs 
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and a truck for his father’s farm. He further charged that relief funds were used to buy 
wrist watches and clothing for relief administrators.223  
 Whether Garland trumped these charges up, or whether he was guilty of them as 
well, is, in the end, less important than the negative image these controversies created for 
the Federal Transient Program. Margot Canaday has already argued that the perceived 
homosexuality of transients severely tarnished the image of the Federal Transient 
Program, making it difficult for proponents to argue for its continued validity. These 
incidences of alcohol abuse and corruption merely made matters worse. This image, plus 
the combination of high turnover and the failure of casework, led to new policy directives 
from Washington that would create dissent among Myron Gwinner and proponents of 
casework in the Missouri transient program.  
 The new policy initiatives represented a break from the conceptual and 
institutional framework established by the Bureau. In early April 1934, Hopkins 
convened a meeting in Washington D.C. of transient administrators to set new rules and 
standards for the state transient programs. Central to the rules presented by Hopkins was 
a view of unattached men at odds with the long held assumptions of the Bureau’s social 
workers. First, though, Hopkins admonished the program administrators for not selling 
the program better to local communities, many of whom complained that transients 
received better relief than they did, which is perhaps unlikely given the description of 
camp life made above. Politicians in Washington, according to Hopkins, similarly 
worried that transients received better care, which demonstrates that even in the highest 
reaches of government, many expressed skepticism about providing relief to the 
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homeless. Hopkins stated that Roosevelt was also losing confidence in the program, and 
that his interests were shifting to the C.C.C. To try to save the program, Hopkins first did 
away with a rule that prohibited men from applying to more than three transient camps. 
Hopkins reasoned that because men took to the road in search of something, they should 
be allowed to make that journey unimpeded. Because casework only slowed this journey 
down, the abandonment of casework for all but the most serious cases formed a crucial 
part of the rule change.224 Hopkins also stated that social workers should no longer try to 
send men back to their communities. By sending men home, the men would merely 
compete for jobs with those individuals who never abandoned their communities and 
therefore deserved the work. Surprisingly, Hopkins also told the administrators that they 
could not prevent men from drinking in the camp, as the camp was now the unattached 
man’s home and administrators had no right to tell a man how to behave in his home. 
Unsurprisingly, when Gebhardt relayed these new rules to the individuals involved in the 
Missouri program, many were upset, Myron Gwinner included.225 
 Opposition to the new rules first coalesced around the decision to do away with 
the decision that abandoned the rule barring men from applying to more than three 
camps. In opposition to this directive, the Bureau redeployed the arguments about public 
largesse it made against the public’s support of street beggars discussed in the first 
chapter. The committee members now argued that, by allowing unlimited applications, 
men could “travel all over the country in a much more luxurious way than ever before.” 
Gwinner added that the original purpose of the transient program was to be so successful 
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that there would no longer need to be a transient program. By allowing the new policies 
to stand, Gwinner warned that the program would “continue to increase rather than 
diminish.” At stake, here, was the Bureau’s long held assumptions about the deviancy of 
unattached men and how best to help them. Gwinner and the others rightly worried that 
the new rules sent from Washington would destroy the rehabilitative, casework aspect of 
the program, and that transient men would stay transient indefinitely. 226  
 In opposition to Hopkins’ new rules, the committee, probably led by Gwinner, 
drafted and voted upon its own set of principles that they believed would bring the 
transient program the success it needed. The new plan expressed the desires of social 
work professionals. First, the committee voted for the eventual elimination of the 
transient program through successful casework. By providing excellent casework to its 
clients, the committee believed that the transient program could eliminate transiency 
altogether. The committee also voted to strengthen local programs for homeless men, 
which it viewed as serving on the front lines. If local programs could work effectively, 
men would not need to leave their homes in the first place. Furthermore, regional work 
camps were to be established that would be open to homeless men throughout that region. 
227 The principles established by the disgruntled committee members were of course not 
binding, the initiatives proclaimed by Hopkins took precedent, and the tensions present in 
this meeting would flare up two months later. Nonetheless, cleavages between local and 
national, public and private, which were built into the structure of the transient program, 
began to become increasingly visible.   
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 Although the arguments that erupted over the program in June 1934 again 
centered upon the role of casework and mobility among the men, the power struggles 
between different elements within a federalized program became visible as well. Some 
committee members expressed discontent with the transient program’s operations 
because national officials did not work closely enough with local communities, who they 
felt had established a satisfactory program for unattached men prior to 1933. Casework 
with unattached men was of course a central element of these programs. It is safe to 
assume that Gwinner, with his long history at the Bureau, was the source of this 
pronouncement. In reply, Gebhardt reaffirmed that, while local officials have some 
decision making power, “certain policies and plans are to be carried out according to 
instructions from Washington.” Some members fired back that those new rules from 
Washington would “overthrow the policy of social work” in the camps. One committee 
member sympathetic to the Washington line reaffirmed the independence of all men to 
move about as they pleased. According to this official, a man had the “privilege of going 
from one center to another until he could find something that suited him.” Gebhardt also 
restated with more clarity why unattached transients should not be sent home: “The 
[unattached] man is to be kept out of competition in his particular community, leaving the 
job open to a man who has a family.”228    
 Officials in Washington and Missouri ultimately clashed because they held 
different interpretations of manhood, in particular, whether it was possible to make 
breadwinning family men out of unattached men. As the Bureau’s work makes clear, 
Gwinner, the Bureau for Homeless Men, and others sympathetic to the social work 
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perspective viewed unattached men as dependent, incapable of solving their own 
problems, and, thus, as socially maladjusted individuals. The Bureau’s professional 
concerns were inseparable from this perspective. Gwinner and the others viewed their 
profession as uniquely capable of rehabilitating unattached men. The new policies from 
Washington threatened not only their professional expertise, but also the existence of 
their job. Washington officials no doubt also viewed unattached and transient men as 
socially maladjusted individuals. The differences derived from the fact that they were less 
sanguine about the ability of the transient program to “adjust” these men to society. At 
the root of this position was the understanding that all men, breadwinner or not, were 
independent. Men were perceived to be free to make their own decisions, and free to deal 
with the bad ones, and their consequences, on their own. Because of this, officials in 
Washington came to disagree that federally funded casework would not be the solution to 
the unattached man’s problem. More importantly, they perceived the transient program to 
be taking away time, energy, and resources from assisting men with families. The 
decision not to renew the transient program in September 1935 reflected these beliefs. 
While the program continued in Missouri after June 1934, the tensions that erupted in 
that month signaled its decline.  
 Soon after the controversies of the summer of 1934, Myron Gwinner resigned 
from his post as chairman of the advisory committee. The record shows that, at least 
since February of that year, not yet six months since the start of the program, Gwinner 
had tried to resign from the advisory committee. The exact nature of Gwinner’s desire to 
resign is unclear, but it seems as though differences between Gwinner and other members 
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of the committee over policy questions was the primary reason.229 Indeed, before and 
during the controversies of the summer, Gwinner privately discussed those problems with 
Robert Wilson of the Family Welfare Association and other members of the advisory 
committee.230 In each case, Gwinner argued, from the position of a private social worker, 
for the primacy of local responsibility, again revealing the tensions of a federalized 
program. To one member of the advisory committee Gwinner wrote that if there was 
“any relief organization in the town or county…it should be handled by them rather than 
a separate state set up.”231 By July 1934 Gwinner finally resigned, but he continued to 
direct all the activities of the transient program in St. Louis for the next year.232 In August 
of 1935, the St. Louis Relief Administration, successor to the Citizens’ Committee on 
Relief and Employment, effected the separation between the public and private agencies 
that Gwinner had long desired. According to Gwinner, though, the Relief Administration 
and transient officials in Jefferson City had yet to make definite plans for the state 
program following the termination of federal support.  
 For the most part, Gwinner’s assessment of the public division’s lack of planning 
for the post-Federal Transient Program period proved to be correct. The primary plan of 
the new “Men’s Unit” was to discontinue the unit as rapidly as possible. This should be 
distinguished from Gwinner’s proclamations of a transient program working itself out of 
existence. Men’s Unit officials hoped to deplete the caseload not through capable 
                                                 
 229 To Myron Gwinner from Richard Gebhardt, 22 February 1934, Folder 313, Box 13, Papers of 
the Bureau for Men.   
 230 To Robert Wilson from Myron Gwinner, 19 April 1934, Folder 53, Box 2, Papers of the 
Bureau for Men; To Loa Howard from Myron Gwinner, 13 June 1934, Folder 313, Box 13, Papers of the 
Bureau for Men.   
 231 To Loa Howard from Myron Gwinner, 13 June 1934, Folder 313, Box 13, Papers of the Bureau 
for Men.  
 232 Annual Report of the Bureau for Homeless Men, 1935, Folder 16, Box 1, Papers of the Bureau 
for Men.   
115 
 
casework, but by shifting the burden of the case load to the WPA, getting some of the 
older men on pensions, and hoping that the economy would improve.233 While it is 
unclear how man men would go on to receive pensions, the other two prongs of the 
program failed to meet the objectives. First, the economy continued to remain sluggish 
with unemployment still high. Furthermore, because the WPA sought to provide jobs first 
to local family men, unattached and transient men rarely made it on WPA projects. 
Because of heavy relief burdens in Missouri, and no doubt elsewhere, “the WPA decided 
rather naturally to care for the local cases first.”234 The WPA’s selection policies serve as 
a sort of culmination to policies developed throughout the New Deal in ways that 
significantly privileged men with families.  
 One report from August of 1935, just before the Federal Transient Program would 
be disbanded, illuminates the difficulty unattached men would soon face. The report, 
issued by the St. Louis Relief Administration, revealed that one single man had been 
placed either in the CCC or a “Veteran’s Camp,” while one other man found refuge in a 
WPA camp.235 This left 5,372 men in Missouri transient camps after September 1935 that 
no longer had a place to go. Within three months, the load had dropped to 2,639 men. 
This precipitous drop did not happen because these men found jobs. Only about 500 
received either private employment or had managed to make it on to a WPA project. 
Unfortunately, further delineation on that statistic is not provided.236 To deal with this 
crisis, transient administrators in Missouri moved men into vacated CCC camps placed 
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under the authority of the WPA. Although the WPA oversaw these camps, they did not 
receive the same level of support received by the regular WPA projects. Instead, the 
camps were mostly “subsistence camps,” and they made available a labor supply to work 
on projects for the National Park Service, Forestry Service, and the Resettlement 
Administration. However, the camps were established only to deal with the present relief 
population. That is, camps were not permitted to take on any new men, their purpose 
being “to take care of the surplus population left in the transient centers...”237 According 
to one transient administrator in Missouri, the WPA intended “to put everyone else to 
work first.”238 By the end of August 1936, the Forestry Service liquidated all its camps 
and by 1937 the National Park Service did the same to all but two of its camps.239 By 
1939, the National Park Service closed its last camps and, with that, public support for 
transients ended, leaving only the Bureau for Homeless Men to care for unattached men.  
 The most significant aspect of the end of the Federal Transient Program for the 
Bureau was that the organization was, for the first time, a totally private agency. From 
1925 to 1933, the Bureau had always received some support from a public source, and 
from 1933 to 1935, the Bureau operated almost entirely as a public agency. In each era, 
its work operated as a function of the total welfare system, albeit a function that was 
always subordinated to welfare programs that helped people deemed more deserving. 
Now, though, Gwinner and the Community Council considered shutting down the Bureau 
at the end of 1935 because funds for its support reached such low levels.240 The case load 
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of the Bureau between 1935 and 1940 reflected this diminished budget. While the records 
are scarce, in the first six months of 1938, for example, 598 men applied to the Bureau, 
but only twenty one received care.241 With the end of the transient program, the Bureau 
was, not unlike the men it served, “living alone.”242  
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Conclusion 
 With the collapse of the Federal Transient Program, and the return of the Bureau 
for Homeless Men to the status of a private agency, the relief situation for homeless, 
unattached men seemingly returned to the years before the Bureau began its operations in 
1925. In 1938, Myron Gwinner, the executive secretary of the Bureau stated frankly that 
“At the present time relief to transients in St. Louis is very much disorganized.” While it 
does appear as if a local, publicly financed shelter opened sometime after 1935, it only 
provided relief to unattached men and boys on an emergency, temporary basis and 
Gwinner found it to be lacking. Gwinner, in response to an inquiry from the St. Louis 
police department concerning shelters to which it could send the roughly two hundred 
homeless men that visited its office per night, stated that these shelters did not often serve 
any food to the men who received relief. Furthermore, the Bureau faced its own financial 
problems resulting from the fallout of the transient program’s demise. Private funds could 
no longer support the Bureau’s caseloads as they had in the past. Because of the Bureau’s 
reduced capacities, homeless men again began to seek out relief from organizations like 
the Salvation Army, which that Bureau had actually supplanted in 1925. By 1940, unable 
to secure funding for its work, the Bureau would turn away from the relief of homeless 
men and toward casework with paroled prisoners. Homeless men, it seems, would have to 
work out solutions to their own problems.243  
 In spite of the apparent circularity of the career of the Bureau for Homeless Men 
between 1925 and 1940, the agency’s activities illuminate many important aspects of 
welfare policy and state development, including the role of gender, the importance of 
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private social workers, and the broader purview of social work in the interwar period. 
First, the Bureau’s programs demonstrate the crucial importance of gender as a factor in 
social policy. The social workers at the Bureau for Homeless Men sought to instill a 
particular vision of manhood through casework. This vision stressed the importance of 
family life as critical element of one’s manhood. Men who existed outside traditional 
family networks, and who operated in relationships that were primarily homosocial, like 
homeless men, were perceived as deviant. The Bureau argued that its client’s problems 
derived from his remoteness from this gender ideal, and not from any economic factors 
related to the inequalities produced by capitalist production. When a man sought relief 
from the Bureau, in the form of food, shelter, clothing, or assistance in finding a job, the 
relief was not simply provided as a matter of course. Instead, the Bureau tied relief to the 
man’s acceptance of a casework regimen. The primary goal of the Bureau’s casework 
agenda was to adjust the homeless man to the ideal of the family man.  
 The Bureau for Homeless Men shared this interest in preserving an idealized 
conception of the family with its social work colleagues and its activities suggest that the 
purview of social work was much broader in the 1920s than previously considered by 
historians. In the past, historians have primarily focused upon social workers who 
assisted single mothers or families. This has limited our understanding of the role of 
social work in American history. The work of the Bureau shows that a particular group of 
men, those who were homeless and unattached, also received assistance from social 
workers interested in the preservation of the family. Indeed, these men’s agencies might 
be conceived of as “companions” to agencies that primarily helped women and children. 
The Bureau’s correspondence, along with social work magazines like The Family, 
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suggest that the organization was not alone. Although social workers interested in 
homeless, unattached men were slightly marginalized in the profession, the Bureau shows 
that these social workers had an important impact on the development of the welfare 
state. The Bureau’s activities with homeless, unattached men played an important role in 
transforming the relief setup in St. Louis, and it laid the groundwork for a federally 
funded transient program in Missouri. This fact raises questions as to who is deserving of 
relief in the United States, and under what conditions. The Bureau’s eventual demise 
suggests that homeless, unattached men were not regarded as worthy of receiving 
publicly funded relief, the implications of which would impact future policies crafted for 
the homeless.      
 As a private welfare agency ostensibly outside the realm of government, the 
actions of the Bureau for Homeless Men were crucial in the transformation of city and 
state policies toward unattached men. Prior to the founding of the Bureau, homeless men 
received very little relief, and were often ignored by the family casework agencies of the 
city. Although the Bureau perceived these men as deviants, the organization nonetheless 
sought improvements in the relief setup and expanded and created programs for homeless 
men. In many cases, such as the anti-begging program, cooperation with public 
institutions like the city government and the police force were critical elements of the 
Bureau’s activities. The programs of the Bureau, and the gendered conceptions of 
manhood that provoked and shaped those programs, laid the groundwork for the 
operation of the Federal Transient Program in Missouri. As the most experienced and 
accomplished agency working for homeless men in Missouri, the Bureau was chosen to 
help develop and administer the program’s activities in Missouri. 
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 If gender played an important role in stimulating the formation of new policies 
and institutions, it also undermined attempts to establish those networks and policies as 
part of the fabric of the welfare state enhanced by New Deal policies because they 
privileged only men who supported families. Although the Federal Transient Program 
operated throughout the United States, the program was not continued once the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration was disbanded and replaced by the Social Security Act 
and the Works Progress Administration. To be sure, it is not as though attempts were not 
made to salvage the program. A Labor Department survey in 1936, in which the Bureau 
for Homeless Men participated, sought to portray to policymakers the extent to which 
homeless, unattached men still needed assistance. Furthermore, the Trammell and Wilcox 
bills, debated throughout 1936, sought to amend the Social Security Act to include a 
federally supported transient program. The bill went nowhere. Although further research 
in this is needed, the Bureau’s experience under the transient program suggests that 
unattached, homeless men were not seen as worthy of receiving relief because they failed 
to conform to certain standards of manhood. When the Federal Transient Program 
dissolved, homeless men would once again have to seek assistance from increasingly 
stretched private agencies, meager city and state programs, and from each other.  
 Unlike advocates for single mothers and the elderly, the Bureau for Homeless 
Men should also be seen as complicit in the failure to inscribe relief for unattached men 
into the higher echelons of the welfare state. Although the Bureau did much to increase 
the relief available to homeless men, its records are noticeably silent concerning why 
public funds, or any funds at all, should be expended on these men. Contrary to the 
advocates for old age pensions or mother’s pensions, the Bureau never argued for the 
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worthiness of its clients. Quite the opposite, the Bureau spent much of its time, both in its 
publications and in private meetings, discussing the deviance of unattached men and the 
danger they posed to family life and society. Instead of advocating for its clients, the 
Bureau for Homeless Men argued for its ability as a professional casework agency to help 
make adjustments in the lives of its clients. The caseworkers sought to cultivate a 
professional aura and portray themselves as gatekeepers of a knowledge that only they 
could properly utilize. The Bureau believed that their professional abilities were reason 
enough for the continued support of its agency. In the end, the Bureau’s desire for 
professionalism, and its failure to make the case for the public support and for the 
worthiness of homeless men, almost completely undermined its existence as a casework 
agency. When the Federal Transient Program was disbanded, the Bureau was barely able 
to survive on the dearth of private funds available and even considered shutting down 
altogether. 
 The success of the Bureau’s programs also relied to some extent upon the 
cooperation of the proposed clients, homeless men. Problematically for the Bureau for 
Homeless Men, its clients were not empty receptacles for the agency’s ideal gender type. 
Many clients simply left in the middle of their casework treatment, thereby foiling the 
Bureau’s casework agenda. This transiency made itself painfully felt during the Bureau’s 
period as an agency under the Federal Transient Program. Most men who visited a 
transient camp, for example, left the camp in under three days, just before they would 
have been required to work and undergo casework. Other men utilized the Bureau’s 
services to their own advantage. This tactic was most evident in the Bureau’s decision to 
develop its own cafeteria program for its clients when it was discovered that men sold 
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their meal tickets for cash, alcohol, or whatever services they might have needed to 
survive. Finally, some men outright resisted the Bureau’s casework program and formed 
single men’s councils to protest the poor conditions of the Bureau’s shelters. 
 Since the demise of the Federal Transient Program in 1935, the United States 
government has not created a large, federally supported program for the homeless, and 
support for this group continues to languish down to the present. While more research 
needs to be done in this area, there appears to be a connection between contemporary 
conditions for the homeless and the experience of the Bureau for Homeless Men during 
the 1920s and 1930s. A study conducted in St. Louis in 1983 and 1984 reveals the dire 
situation faced by the urban homeless. Like the clients of the Bureau for Homeless Men, 
almost all the homeless individuals studied were single, widowed, or divorced.244 
Furthermore, homeless men in this study received very little support in terms of adequate 
shelter, food, clothing, or medical treatment from public or private sources. In fact, the 
men in this study spent on average one fourth of their nights sleeping not in a shelter, but 
on the streets.245 Although almost all the homeless individuals in the study desired 
permanent housing, affordable housing was simply not made available for an 
overwhelming number.246 Contrary to the Bureau, however, this study discovered, or at 
least finally recognized, that homelessness was more than simply a detachment from a 
family unit, and that homelessness affected a broader spectrum of the population beyond 
white men. Homeless women comprised half the study, and two thirds of all the homeless 
in the study were racial minorities, mostly African American. To be sure, white women 
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and racial minorities always comprised a broader portion of the Bureau’s caseloads than 
it liked to admit. With the demise of the Federal Transient Program, a unified effort to 
further explore these dimensions of homelessness was effectively cut off. 
 Current approaches to understanding unattached men also mirror those of the 
Bureau. In a recent study conducted by the Institute for Family Studies titled, “Why 
Working Class Men are Falling Behind,” author Michael Jindra points to alienation from 
family life as a primary cause of male poverty. Quoting a sociologist from the University 
of Pennsylvania, Jindra writes that a man disconnected from family life lives “without 
attachments and by the time they are forty or fifty years old, the things that kept these 
men from falling away – family and community life – are gone.”247 According to Jindra, 
men who become detached from family life seek out relationships and friendships with 
other men to replace family life. Disconnecting from families and seeking fulfilment in 
all male groups “contributes to a widening gulf between those more connected to family, 
work, and society” and prevents these men from being successful.248 The connections the 
author makes between a man’s lack of heterosocial family ties and his abundance of 
homosocial friendships points clearly back toward the assumptions of the Bureau, and 
reveals that the economic problems faced by vulnerable men are often understood 
through the language of family and gender.  
 While many of the perceptions of unattached men today mirror those of Bureau, 
the relief networks for these men have arguably diminished from the 1920s and 1930s. In 
fact, St. Louis has provided few services for the homeless until the past twenty to thirty 
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years. Since then, the city has constructed about 1,400 housing units for the “chronically 
homeless.” Unfortunately, this technical term only designates those who have been on the 
street more than a year and who have a disability. Ironically, the city’s focus on 
permanent housing has caused the number of emergency beds in the city to decrease. 
While the city hoped to pair a focus on permanent housing with an expansion of shelters, 
this has not happened in either the city or St. Louis County because of opposition from 
residents.249 
 The situation for the homeless could deteriorate further if the largest shelter in St. 
Louis, the New Life Evangelistic Center, operated by the Reverend Larry Rice, succumbs 
to a petition signed by downtown residents to close it down. Rice’s shelter opened in 
1976 and is the city’s largest homeless shelter. Like the Bureau, Rice perceives the 
homeless through his own particular lens, which in this case is religion. For Rice, the 
New Life Evangelistic Center is about evangelism first, and a shelter second. Indeed, the 
“shelter is simply a function of worship.”250 Rice’s shelter not only serves the homeless of 
downtown, but also men and women who have traveled from around the region from 
cities and states with fewer services for the homeless. However, the shelter is in the 
center of downtown, at 14th and Locust streets, and is surrounded by an increasingly 
gentrified neighborhood. In September 2013, residents of the high end lofts surrounding 
the shelter have filed petitions to close it down, citing lewd behavior in the streets such as 
drinking and drug abuse. While the petitioners have cited two instances of people moving 
away from downtown in reaction to the shelter, they have nonetheless conceded that the 
population of downtown continues to grow in spite of the shelter. Furthermore, many 
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problems related to public disorder are also the result of the increased number of bars and 
clubs in the neighborhood, which serve the wealthy loft residents. Larry Rice is of course 
not without blame – he is reported to have a worth in the tens of millions of dollars, while 
the shelter appears dilapidated – but even the smaller shelters in the city say that if Rice’s 
shelter did not exist, conditions for the homeless in St. Louis would continue to 
deteriorate. Faye Abram, a professor of social work at St. Louis University nicely sums 
up the case for keeping the shelter open: “The evidence suggests that it’s unlikely that the 
nuisance behaviors occurring outside New Life Evangelistic Center would be eliminated 
or alleviated if the center was closed.”251   
When one considers the possible solutions to the problem of homelessness in the 
United States, hope might not be the first feeling to arise. The long term unemployment 
and mental health issues faced by many precludes hopeful prospects for employment 
even in the low wage sector of a postindustrial economy. However, Phoenix, Arizona 
might provide a template for future policy. As of December 2013, Phoenix, through a 
combination of local, federal, and private sector funds, has placed all of its homeless 
veterans, over two hundred in all, in subsidized housing, effectively ending homelessness 
among veterans. Admittedly, homeless veterans make up only ten percent of the total 
homeless, but Phoenix Mayor Greg Stanton plans to extend this program to the city’s 
other nonveteran homeless residents. While policymakers and those individuals interested 
in the problem of homelessness should follow this lead, they will undoubtedly face stiff 
political resistance because social provisions are not frequently made for those who do 
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not or cannot work and are otherwise not the recipients of widespread sympathy. What is 
needed then, and what Phoenix’s plan begins to express, is a rationale for relief and 
assistance that transcends the individual’s worth in a capitalist economy and advocates 
for a broader conception of worth and citizenship.        
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